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ABSTRACT 
     This paper reports experiments motivated by ongoing controversies regarding tick size in 
markets. The minimum tick size in a market dictates discrete values at which bids and asks can 
be tendered by market participants.  All transaction prices must occur at these discrete values, 
which are established by the rules of each exchange. The simplicity of experiments helps to 
distinguish among competing models of complex real-world securities markets. We observe 
patterns predicted by a matching (cooperative game) model.  Because a price grid damages the 
equilibrium of the competitive model, the matching model provides predictions where the 
competitive model cannot. Their predictions are the same when a competitive equilibrium exists. 
The experiment examines stable allocations, average prices, timing of order flow and price 
dynamics. Larger tick size invites more speculation, which in turn increases liquidity. However, 
increased speculation leads to inefficient trades that otherwise would not have occurred.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION: THE POLICY ORIGIN
1
 
          The issue we study has its origin in the discrete nature of trading units, whether it is the 
unit of value or the “blocks” in which goods are transferred.  The issue is brought into systematic 
focus by a controversy found in financial markets. Our focus is on very simple markets in which 
the issue can be studied experimentally.  Our experimental approach is exploratory rather than a 
testing of theory because there is no refined or accepted theory to “test”. However, our initial 
experiments suggest a theory that has not been applied previously to continuous markets. 
Subsequent experiments explore its features.   
          Policy debates on optimal tick size in financial markets have continued since the 
decimalization campaign in 1990s. According to Harris (1997)’s review on decimalization, the 
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proponents for small tick sizes suggest that a small price increment would lead to smaller bid-ask 
spreads, hence encouraging price competition and decreasing cost of public traders. The SEC 
shared this viewpoint and since 2000, the U.S. equity markets have transformed from fractional 
ticks to penny increments.  
More recently, however, arguments have emerged to re-increase tick sizes (Weild, Kim 
and Newport 2012), supported by claims that small tick sizes have repressed IPOs for small cap 
enterprises and that wider spreads, by increasing profit for market makers, would lead to more 
research and attract investors to small cap stocks, thus fostering a financial ecosystem for smaller 
companies. The SEC is skeptical.
 2
 Nevertheless, a pilot program of increasing tick size has been 
put into practice in 2016, despite the strong suspicion on its effectiveness from the commission.  
         Policy discussion and empirical studies in the academic literature lacks consensus 
regarding effects of the tick size. The smaller spread and improved price efficiency from small 
tick size has been reported (Harris 1994, 1997, 1999; Bessembinder 2003; Chakravarty, Wood 
and Van Ness 2004; Chung, Charoenwong and Ding 2004). However, research suggests that 
liquidity is harmed since the size of limit orders has become smaller after decimalization 
(Bacidore, Battalio and Jennings 2003). The effect on informed traders is unclear according to 
Gibson, Singh and Yerramilli (2003).
3
  
          Progress on theoretical foundations is found in the market microstructure literature but 
there is no generally accepted conclusion. A natural division of liquidity provider and liquidity 
                                           
2
 The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (the JOBS Act) of 2012 has begun to address the issue. The SEC, 
according to their report responding to the Act (Report to Congress on Decimalization 2012) and a subsequent report 
(Recommendation of the Investor Advisory Committee Decimalization and Tick Sizes), demonstrated its belief that 
decline in smaller company IPOs is caused by other exogenous factors rather than decimalization and increasing tick 
size will only benefit market makers at the cost of retail investors.  
 
3
 Zhao and Chung (2006) test two contradicting hypotheses whether decimalization increases the probability of 
information-based trading due to smaller spread or reduces it because of undercutting, and shows that the first effect 
dominates. Although small tick size might have an effect on IPO of small cap companies, the decrease in IPO is 
mainly due to the increasing merge and acquisition of small companies into large corporations (Gao, Ritter and Zhu 
2013). In the recent literature of high frequency trading, Yao and Ye (2016) find that an increase in tick size hinders 
price competition, generates rents for liquidity provision and encourages speed competition, resulting in higher 
proportion of liquidity provided by high frequency traders. Saar and Zhong (2015) document the same advantage 
enjoyed by HFT from large tick size. In addition, their empirical results show that the positive correlation between 
tick size and market volume only exists when the minimum price variation is binding, and otherwise the opposite 
relationship is found due to greater adverse selection. Moreover, the literature on stock splitting (Anshuman and 
Kalay 2002), exchange fees (Chao, Mao and Ye 2016) and dark pool suggest that the market automatically adapts to 
the optimal tick size itself (Dayri and Rosenbaum 2015), which brings into question the necessity of a uniform 
standard in tick size.  
 
4 
 
taker, represented by market makers and public traders respectively, has been inherited by 
subsequent theoretical studies ever since the fundamental work of Garman (1975) and Kyle 
(1985).  The motivations for liquidity and immediacy as connected to market microstructures are 
explored by Demesetz (1968) and subsequent work by Garman (1975) and O’Hara (1995).  
Under that type of framework, small price variation lowers trading cost and leaves more surplus 
to the traders while large tick size increases rents enjoyed by the market maker and results in a 
higher incentive to provide liquidity. The separation of liquidity provider and taker simplifies the 
modeling of the market game.  However, it is unable to explain some empirical controversies; for 
example, the insignificance of correlation between liquidity and tick size in some markets.  
          Our paper rests on laboratory experimental methods and with a return to the classical 
models of demand and supply, presumably based on fundamentals, departs from much of the 
existing literature. The competitive equilibrium model includes theories of price adjustment 
toward an equilibrium and conditions that define equilibrium.  However, in the presence of a 
price grid, a competitive equilibrium need not exist and the lack of existence of equilibrium 
essentially prevents the straightforward application of the classical approach.   
However, recent studies by Hatfield, Plott and Tanaka (2012, 2016) develop a model for 
markets where a classical equilibrium does not exist. The notion of competitive equilibrium is 
replaced by the concept of a stable outcome and the development of stable matchings is viewed 
as the process through which trading is organized. The matching model produces precise 
predictions of price and volume even when the competitive equilibrium does not exist due to the 
existence of price ceilings and floors. More substantially, with the notion of stable outcome as a 
generalization of competitive equilibrium, it’s possible to study the market behavior in a 
disaggregate way and the principles that underlie market behavior as connected to traditional 
laboratory experimental results.  
 
 2. OVERVIEW OF PAPER 
The paper is organized as follows. Two different experimental environments are studied.  
The first experimental environment studied in Series One, explores the impact of a price grid in 
the light of preferences that reflect no uncertainty about value to the participant.  The classical 
method of preference inducement is used.  The second set of experiments, Series Two, explores 
the case in which a security pays an uncertain, common dividend to all holders of the security.  
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The dividend is chosen randomly according to a public distribution. Each buyer receives an 
independently drawn signal of the dividend conditional on the actual dividend.  
While the individual values are different between the two series, the theory used to 
produce predictions is the same.  Section 3 outlines the experimental environment and market 
structure.  Section 4 discusses the theoretical framework of assignments and stability 
(equilibrium) in the double auction market with a price grid.  The section compares predictions 
from a matching model to predictions by classical competitive equilibrium. Section 5 introduces 
details of the experiments used to evaluate the models and provides some experimental 
background material. In section 6, we present the environment and parameters for Series One. 
Section 7 discusses the experimental results from Series One and compares the two competing 
hypotheses.  Section 8 presents the parameters and discusses results from Series Two 
experiments.  Section 9 addresses the information contained in Series Two prices. Section 10 is a 
summary of conclusions.  
 
 3.  MARKET ORGANIZATION, PRICE GRIDS AND STABLE OUTCOMES AS MARKET 
EQUILIBRIA 
The markets we study are organized by a computerized double auction with an order 
book implemented by traditional experimental economics methods. Preferences are induced with 
financial incentives and differ between the two types of experimental sessions discussed in 
Section 5.  In series one preferences are constructed from the classical method in which demand 
and supplies are individually induced.  In series two, a common and randomly determined 
common dividend is paid with each trader having different private information about the 
dividend  
          In both series, the market models are closely related to concepts of demand, supply and the 
resulting competitive equilibria. The specific market demand and supply parameters depend on 
the induced preferences and can differ from series to series and experiment to experiment.   
However, while the numerical predictions depend on specific parameters, the principles of 
competitive equilibrium and of stable matches do not.  
           Preferences are induced with financial incentives. Trading among agents takes place in a 
public market.  In addition, each agent has a private market in which interactions with the 
experimenter take place. Subjects classified as “Sellers” acquire the units for sale by buying the 
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units at fixed prices made available by the experimenter in the seller’s private market. The seller 
keeps the difference between the price of a unit paid by the buyer to the seller and the price at 
which seller purchased the unit from the experimenter.  Subjects classified as “Buyers” make 
money by buying in the market from sellers and selling acquired units at fixed prices made 
available by the experimenter in the buyer’s private market. The buyer keeps the difference 
between the price of a unit paid to the seller and the price received for the unit from the 
experimenter. 
          A classification of agents according to their behavior will be useful. Fundamentalists are 
sellers who never attempt to buy in the public market and buyers who never attempt to sell in the 
public market. Speculators are defined conversely as sellers who put a buy order and as buyers 
who put a sell order in the public market. Sellers who buy in the public market make a profit on 
the transaction only if they can resell the unit in the public market at a higher price. Buyers who 
sell in the public market make a profit on the transaction only if they buy it back at a lower price. 
Thus, speculators are exposed to some risk of loss on the transaction. 
          Market supply and demand functions are derived from the induced preferences of 
individual sellers and buyers in a natural way. For purposes of exposition in the text presented 
here, the buyers and sellers have incentives for only one unit but the experimental incentives 
were based on multiple units.
4
 The potential costs to the seller of acquiring units from the 
experimenter, the individual seller’s marginal costs, are limit prices that can be configured into a 
market supply curve. That is, the marginal cost is the minimum price at which the seller can sell 
in the public market without making a loss. Let S denote the set of all sellers. Let ci denote the 
marginal cost of seller i that the seller i finds in seller i’s private market. For any price P, there is 
                                           
4
          Market demand and supply are derived from the induced preferences following standard procedures.   The 
induced preferences are explained in detail in later sections but the key concepts are easily explained from a market 
aggregate perspective. The potential cost to the sellers of acquiring units from the experimenter can be configured 
into a market supply curve.  That is if C(x) is the total cost of x units paid to the experimenter we represent the 
marginal cost , C
 
(x), as C(x) so P = C
 
(x) is the relationship between marginal cost to price and is used to derive a 
market supply function, x = S(P). An example is the curve SS in Figure 1.  If the potential value the buyers received 
from the experimenter from delivering units is R(x) then the marginal value, R 
 
(x) and the equation P= R 
 
(x)  
relates the  buyer marginal value to price and can be configured into a market demand , x=D(P) as shown in Figure 1 
as DD. 
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a subset of sellers SP⊆S such that SP= {i∈ S: ci ≤P}. The aggregation of sellers’ limit prices is 
used to derive market supply function x = S(P)=|SP|. Namely, the market supply at price P is the 
number of sellers with marginal cost less than or equal to P. An example is the curve SS in 
Figure 1. 
          Similarly, the orders placed in individual buyer’s private markets are the value received 
from units acquired in the public market (the “utility” so to speak). It reflects a simple arbitrage 
opportunity in which the buyer buys in the public market and sells to the experimenter at the 
price found in the buyer’s private market and keeps the profit. The marginal values found in the 
buyers private markets, can be configured into a market demand curve. Let B denote the set of 
all buyers. Let vj be the marginal value that j finds in buyer j’s private market. For any price P, 
there is a subset of buyers DP ⊆ 𝐵 such that DP = {j  B : vj  P}. The aggregation of buyers’ 
preference is used to derive market demand function x = D(P)=|DP|, as shown in Figure 1 as DD. 
Namely, the market demand at price P is the number of buyers with marginal value higher than 
or equal to P. 
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Figure 1:  Market Demand and Supply with a Grid.  In the absence of a grid, the competitive 
equilibrium prices are between the first excluded demand and supply units. The upper support of 
interval is the marginal cost of first excluded unit in the supply curve and the lower support is the 
marginal value of the first excluded unit in the demand curve. The competitive equilibrium 
quantity is set by the last included demand and supply units.  The bold dashed lines signify the 
equilibrium based on the assumption that the curves are continuous.  
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          The market is organized by a computerized double auction.  Both buyers and sellers tender 
time stamped offers for multiple units at a stated price per unit (a limit order) that are placed in a 
public order book with price priority.  In case of multiple orders with the same price, the first-in 
first-out principle is employed.  A sell order tendered at a price below the highest priced buy 
order sells at the highest buy order price and a buy order tendered above the lowest priced sell 
order sells at the lowest sell order price.  The classical competitive equilibrium consists of the 
price where the quantity demanded equals the quantity supplied which would correspond to (P*, 
Q*) in Figure 1 if the curves were continuous.  
          If tick sizes are imposed, then the price grids determined by the tick size are the only 
prices at which buy and sell orders can be tendered.  Examples are the light dotted lines as shown 
in Figure 1.  When the competitive equilibrium price P* is not on the grid, the competitive 
equilibrium does not exist.  For example, in Figure 1 the competitive market price, P*, is not on 
one of the dotted grid lines.  The grid prices above and below the competitive equilibrium price 
are effectively a ceiling and a floor that prevent convergence. 
          In the classical economic environment, the assignment/matching model is a natural 
generalization of competitive equilibrium that can be applied in the presence of price floors and 
ceilings, of which the price grid imposed by a tick size is a special case.  We adapt the Hatfield, 
Plott and Tanaka (2012, 2016) method by modeling the trading activity as a two-sided matching 
in a continuous double auction with an open book.
5
 Under the matching framework, bids and 
asks are interpreted as traders’ attempts to form a match. A match happens when the buyer and 
seller have agreed on the price and quantity specified by the bids and asks and signed an 
exchange contract accordingly. The stable assignment/match is a situation when no individual 
wants to leave the match unilaterally or no pair of agents is willing to break their current match 
and form a new match with other agents given the opportunity.  
 
4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A competitive equilibrium does not always exist when a price grid is present. Recent 
literature has used principles from matching and assignment theories to construct models of 
markets without competitive equilibria due to price floors and ceilings. We inherit that modeling 
                                           
5
 Hatfield, Plott and Tanaka (2012) focus on single unit trades and use an assignment framework. Hatfield, Plott and 
Tanaka (2016) generalize the model to multiple unit trades and use a matching model framework. 
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strategy as well as solution concepts to build the theoretical foundation for a market with a price 
grid. 
          There is a finite set of buyers B and a finite set of sellers S trading the same good in a 
market.  For purposes of model development, we assume that each buyer and seller deals with 
only a single unit.  The fact that trading takes place in real time creates both practical and 
theoretical complexities in multiple unit matching models. At a practical level traders in today’s 
markets, in contrast to long-term investors, tend to have very short horizons and typically focus 
on a single stock or bond at a time; i.e., they do not worry about non-diversified inventory 
positions because they typically divest them promptly.  At a theoretical level the assumption of a 
single unit is more than just an expositional simplification.  Models of stable matches are based 
on the cooperative game model in which all options are available in a static sense as is the 
information about all potential contracts. Given this broad set the choices are simultaneous. . 
Useful  formal developments the multiple unit theory are found at HKNOW (2013) and HPT 
(2015). 
 
4.1 Preferences 
          Multiple unit incentives in a continuous double auction environment create a challenge for 
assignment models, which tend to be static.  All decisions take place simultaneously or in well-
defined stages,  By contrast a continuous market operates in real time with no schedule 
coordinating the timing of decisions. As a result individual decisions need not conform to the 
consistency predicted by static theory and might be interpreted as a failure of the rationality 
conditions of the model. 
          We adopt a modeling convention that addresses the problem by assigning each unit a value 
and treating the unit as an agent.   The modeling challenge is that a contract executed later in 
time might be profitably substituted for an earlier contract suggesting that the agent is irrational 
for agreeing to the first of the two contracts.   However such actions are also consistent with  the 
fact that the early contract was made when information about a later contract was not available 
and hindsight provides an incentive to exercise options that were never available given the real 
time in which contracts evolve.  We avoid the issue through the implementation of two 
postulates. The first assigns a value to the units and allows the unit to be assigned a contract if 
profitable.   The second is to disallow the transfer of contracts among units.  The combination 
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facilitates the identification of stable matches.  The loss is the ability to capture the dynamics of 
portfolio theory.  
          We depart from HPT (2016) and the associated model of stable matches by including an 
experimental fact of "sequence induced preferences" or "order dictated preferences".  Values for 
buyers and sellers are assigned in an experimentally dictated order meaning that the value of a 
unit to the buyer or seller is dictated by the number of units consumed or produced by the 
particular agent prior to the consumption or production of the unit in question.  That is, the value 
of the ith unit to a consumer is the marginal value created by the ith unit in an induced value or 
cost function.  Since the marginal value decreases as units increase on the demand side and 
increases on the cost side the details must be acknowledged.    
          The second postulate is that a contract for the ith unit cannot be transferred to the jth.  That 
is, a contract cannot be transferred from one unit to another. Substitution of contracts among 
units or individuals is not allowed.  In the continuous double auction contracts take place in a 
sequence. The transfer of a contract from one unit to another would be an implicit change of the 
trading sequence and would separate the market from the real time in which information and 
contract opportunities take place.  It is as if each unit is identified as an agent and the non-
transferability of a contract is a natural constraint since it would take place outside the market.   
          With the exception of speculation the combined impact of the axioms is that each unit can 
be associated with its own value as determined by its order in the consumption/acquisition.    Let 
the form of redemption value and cost functions be F(x) where x =|C| if C is a set of 
contracts.  Now let f(k) = F(k) - F(k-1) so F(x) =   Σk{1,2,...,x} f(k)  and the value of unit k is f(k).   
If F(x) is interpreted as a utility function then f(k) is the marginal utility and if F(k) is the cost 
then f(k) is the marginal cost of the kth unit.  The marginal value of a unit becomes the unit’s 
own value and thus the unit can be treated as an individual with a value for a single unit. 
          Since the units have their own value there is no need to carry the identity of the (human) 
agent associated with the value. For theoretical purposes we can index the demand side units 
from high to low and the supply side units from low to high. So the unit index becomes the 
agent. 
Let value for the one unit of buyer agent i be V(i) and cost of the one unit of seller agent 
j be C(j). Let p(i,j) be the price paid by i to j for the one unit supplied to i by j. A trade results in 
the utility for the buyer equal to ui (p (i, j)) =V(i)- p(i,j) and the utility for the seller equal to     
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uj (p (i, j)) = p(i,j) - C(j). The notation p(i,i) means that agent i does not engage in a trade ( 
trades with self) and thus make no gains from the match, namely ui (p (i, i))=0. 
          Allowing slight abuse of notation, we also allow D(p) to denote the set of buyers who 
have an induced demand values no lower than p; let S(p)denote the set of sellers, the agents 
who have an induced cost no higher than p. For a given price p, the market demand and supply 
functions are: 
D(p) =| D(p)| = |{i∈D: V(i)≥ p}| and 
S(p) =| S(p)| =  |{i∈S: C(i)≤ p}| 
          The classical definition competitive equilibrium (CE) is a mathematical property of the 
parameters. The CE price is a price p* and a quantity q*,  such that D(p*) = q* = S(p*).   
          Given that linearity and integer values can be part of the analysis, more detailed 
definitions are needed for precision.   The CE is an interval
6
.  The upper support of the CE 
interval is the marginal cost associated with the first excluded unit and the lower support of the 
CE is the marginal redemption value of the first excluded unit.   This interval will be called the 
CE if it is not constrained away by the price grid and the virtual competitive equilibrium, the 
VCE, if the price grid makes attainment impossible. 
 
4.2 Matches and Assignments 
          A “match” (also called a “contract”) specifies the parties and the terms of the trade. 
Denote a match as <(i,j),p(i,j)> , where (i,j) denotes the two agents, buyer  i and seller j,  and 
p(i,j)  is the trading price paid by i to j. A match ( contract) satisfies conditions of individual 
rationality,  ui (p (i, j)) =V(i) – p(i,j) > 0 and uj (p (i, j)) = p(i,j) - C(j) > 0.   An assignment in the 
market is a set of matches that satisfy the resource constraint of agents (one unit per person) 
and are contracted at feasible prices. Denote an assignment as G. The buyer agent i’s utility 
                                           
6
 The definition of equilibrium in the presence of integer units is a bit more complex.  Let 𝑧 be an index of buy 
orders (bids) ordered from high to low and sell orders (asks), ordered from low to high. Thus, 𝑧 is an index of 
ordered pairs (𝑏(𝑧), 𝑎(𝑧)), where 𝑏(𝑧) is the bid, and 𝑎(𝑧) is the ask of the 𝑧th pair. Let 𝑧∗ be the smallest 𝑧 for 
which 𝑏(𝑧 + 1) < 𝑎(𝑧 + 1). Thus 𝑧∗ is the index of the "last trade", the last accepted bid and the last accepted ask. 
The competitive equilibrium price is any 𝑝∗ > 0 such that:  
(i) For 𝑧 ≤ 𝑧∗, 𝑏(𝑧) ≥ 𝑝∗ and 𝑎(𝑧) ≤ 𝑝∗; and 
(ii) 𝑝∗ ∈ [max{𝑏(𝑧∗ + 1), 𝑎(𝑧∗)} , min{𝑏(𝑧∗), 𝑎(𝑧∗ + 1)}. 
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from the assignment G is ui (p (i, j)) and the seller j’s utility from the assignment G is uj (p (i, j)) 
where <(i,j),p>∈G. 
 
      
 
4.3 Price grid 
Given a grid, the feasible prices in the market takes the form p=ng where n is an integer 
and g is the size of the grid. If P is the set of admissible prices then P = {p: p = ng for some n}.  
Suppose p* is the equilibrium price of a model. If there exists an integer n* such that p*= n*g, 
then, abstracting from the dynamics, the situation is the same with the no-grid case in the sense 
that the competitive equilibrium (CE) price is feasible. However, if such n* does not exist then 
the CE price is not feasible and from the point of view of a model, the CE does not exist.  
 
  Let the set of feasible prices be P. When the theoretical CE price is not on the grid, we 
denote it as the virtual competitive equilibrium (VCE).  When CE price is not feasible we 
identify the VCE price as p* and we also identify two prices that are important, pU and pL.  
According to the definition of demand and supply set, we can find two price levels pU  P and 
pL  P  as the lowest price and highest price, respectively such that: 
pU-pL=g,  D(pU) < S(pU) and S(pL)<D(pL) and pU  p* pL. 
Namely at two feasible neighbor grids pU and pL, there is excess demand at pL and excess 
supply at pU.  pU and pL are called the upper and lower bounding prices respectively.  
Notice that if the grid is size 0 the pU and pL can be interpreted as the upper and lower 
supports of the interval of CE prices that define the CE. 
4.4 Stable assignments 
          When there exists a price grid such that CE price is not feasible, we apply stable 
assignment to describe the equilibrium of the market. The stable assignment must satisfy two 
conditions: 
S1: Non-blocking condition 
14 
 
An assignment G

 blocks an assignment G if there is a pair of individuals (, ) such 
that u (p

(, ))  u (p (, j))  and u (p

(, ))   u (p(i, )).
7
  An assignment G is not 
blocked if there is no other assignment G

 that blocks G.  
S2: Individual rationality condition 
An assignment G is individual rational if for all <(i,j),p(i,j)> ∈ G ,ui (p(i, j))  0 and uj (p (i, j)) 
>0  
Note that if the model is based on individuals with single units rather than multiple units the 
individual rationality condition is different from those used in Hatfield et al. (2016).  In a 
multiple-unit environment, we treat each unit from the same person as an independent agent. We 
impose the individual rationality constraint for each unit instead of individual subjects who 
typically trade multiple units. By treating each unit separately, we are able to rule out ex post 
regret by subjects. An example of ex post regret of trader with multiple items is as follows. A 
buyer has two items each with value of 100 and 50 and then bought them for 60 and 40, 
respectively. The total profit is 50, but by reneging on the contract for the cost 50 item and 
buying the value 100 item for 40, the profit increases to 60. In first glance, this looks like an 
unstable outcome, but note that when buying the cost 100 item, the opportunity to buy it for 40 
presumably did not exist. Due to the dynamic nature of the environment the purchase of both 
items is not irrational behavior by the buyer. Furthermore, it is even possible that if the buyer had 
not purchased the value 100 item at 60, the future opportunity to purchase the value 50 item 
might not have arisen. 
8
  
 
4.5 Characterization of stable assignments 
Our discussion will be confined to the conditions that are relevant to the limited 
conditions of our experiments.  The demands and supply functions are linear and for purposes 
of characterizing the predictions, the individual demands and supplies are limited to one unit. 
                                           
 
8
 Looking ahead at our data, 24% of the trades involve outcomes where an agent would like to change the contracts 
if switching between an agent’s own units were possible. If the sequence of actual trades is considered then these 
instances  involve no instances of irrationality.  Of course, if each item is treated as a single entity, there is no issue 
and the number of potential instances is reduced to zero. However, one can imagine a different issue even though it 
never occurs in our data. When a subject has multiple value/cost opportunities within the bounding grid, the prices 
are dictated by the bounds and when the bid or ask was submitted. One can imagine a series of actions that could 
result in the agent would prefer to revere the order in which the trades occurred. 
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           The first proposition was established for very broad environments are just restated here 
for orientation. 
 
Proposition 1.  The Competitive Equilibrium is a stable assignment   
Proof.  Let the size of the grid be 0. In the proof of Observation 1 let the upper support of the 
CE play the role of pU and let the lower support of the CE play the role of pL.   With the 
change of notation the proof of Proposition 1 follows as a corollary to  Observation 1. 
 
While the actual experimental markets involve multiple unit incentives for buyers and 
for sellers, Figure 2 illustrates the stable assignments under the conditions of one-unit 
capacities of traders and linear demand and supply functions.  The VCE is represented in the 
figure and is bounded by pU and pL and these grids place an upper and lower bound on 
contract prices. That fact is summarized by observation 1. 
 
Observation 1. Stable assignments cannot involve contracts above pU or below pL. 
proof. Any assignment containing the contract <(i,j), p> with  i  D(pU) and payment p  pU is 
blocked by the an assignment <(i,j), pU > where j S (pU) because i prefers pU to p and 
because there exists an unmatched j due to the fact that S(pU)is larger than D(pU).  A similar 
argument demonstrates that any assignment with p pL is blocked. 
           The second observation, Observation 2, is not reflected directly in the figure because the 
demand and supply in the figure are not symmetric.  Respectively they do not intersect pU and 
pL at the same quantity as required by the observation.   However Observation 2 demonstrates 
explicitly that in the symmetric case where the VCE is located exactly between pU and pL all 
stable contracts will involve a buyer with value at or above pU and a seller with a cost at or 
below pL. 
 
Observation 2.   If demand and supply functions are mirror images and monotonic (respectively 
decreasing and increasing), the family of matched pairs from D(pU) and S(pL) at prices pU and 
pL is a stable assignment. 
proof.  Suppose the assignment is not stable then there must exist a blocking pair and a p* or 
individual rationality is not satisfied. Any blocking pair must involve either an i from D(pU) or 
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j from S(pL) by the definition of blocking and stability.  Suppose i* and j* are blocking with i* 
 D(pU) and j*  S:  pL C(j*)≤ pU .  p* cannot be at pU because i* would not be better off. 
p* cannot be at pL because the rationality of j* would be violated due to the fact that pL  
C(j*)≤pU. Since pL and pU are the only possible prices we have a contradiction that <(i*,j*) 
p*> is blocking. Individual rationality is satisfied since any subject in D(pU) prefers to be 
matched at pU or pL rather than unmatched and the same with S(pL). 
           The next observation addresses the case of asymmetry between market demand and 
supply as well as relative to the VCE. As is illustrated in the figure, when there is more 
demanded at pU than is supplied at pL not all buyers able to buy at pL will find a seller who 
can sell at pL.  That is, there is limited supply at pL which forces buyers to contract at pU.  The 
number of contracts that occur at pU and pL is dictated by relative slopes of the demand and 
supply functions. 
 
Observation 3. The stable assignments always include buyer values at or above the upper 
bounding grid or seller costs that are at or below the lower bounding grid or both. Thus, the 
limitation of values at or outside the lower and upper price bounds influences the proportion of 
trades at the two bounding prices. 
proof. Suppose A = {<(i,j) p>}  is a stable assignment. If   <(i*,j*) p*>  A then either 
(1) [ i*  D: V(i)  pU] or (2 ) [ j*  S:C(j)≤ pL] or both. 
Notice that the existence of the grid dictates that p* {pU,pL}.  If neither 1 nor 2 are satisfied 
then either  V(i*) – p*  0  or p* - C(j*)0 so rationality is violated. 
The matching model suggests that prices will bounce between pL and pU in proportions 
dictated by the demand and supply slopes as well as the range of potential volumes. 
Observation 4 provides a partial characterization.  The support is easily inferred from figure 2.  
 
Observation 4:  Trading volume is in the range (Max{D(pU), S(pL)}, Min{D(pL), S(pU)}). 
Additional volume could reflect speculation. 
 Proof. Assume that the trading volume is smaller than Max{D(pU), S(pL)}. If 
D(pU)≥S(pL), then there exists an i  D(pU) that is unmatched. From observation 1, we know 
all matches are at either pU or pL. Furthermore, we know that there exists a j S(pU) that is 
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unmatched since S(pU) > D(pU). Then i and j become a profitable match at pU. The argument 
is symmetric when D(pU)≤S(pL). 
Now assume that the trading volume is larger than Min{D(pL), S(pU)}. 
If D(pL) ≥ S(pU), then there exists a j S(pU) that is matched. However, from observation 1, 
we know all matches at either pU or pL and this violates the individual rationality of j. The 
argument is symmetric when  D(pL) ≤ S(pU). 
 
Figure 2 illustrates how the stable outcome will appear in the experiment. Shown there is 
an equilibrium price, P*, bounded by the lower grid bound, l, and the upper grid bound, h. As 
can be seen, if a grid prevents the use of price levels between these two bounds the competitive 
equilibrium price does not exist from the point of view of a market model. That is, the CE can be 
defined as a mathematical property of the parameters but it does not exist as a property of a 
model of market behavior. 
If price ceilings and/or floors exist presumably, the market price(s) will rest at the 
constraint(s). An excess supply or demand will necessarily exist. One hypothesis is that the 
excess demand or supply will be expressed as bids or asks and trades will take place. The exact 
volume is not clearly predicted by the model. The expectations and beliefs that accompany this 
process are not well specified by a generally accepted model. 
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Figure 2:  Assignment model allocation stable set. 
 
 
  
These values are below lower bound grid price and seller can profitably sell 
at either the upper bound grid price or the lower bound grid price.     
These values are above the upper bound and buyer can profitably buy at 
either the upper bound grid price or the lower bound grid price.     
These units can only profitably sold at 
only the upper bound grid.  
These units can be profitably bought at 
only the lower bound grid price.   
The maximum number of trades that can exist in an 
assignment without speculation.  
The maximum supply pU under the competitive model. 
pU: Upper 
boundary 
pL: Lower 
boundary 
VCE 
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5. EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT 
The consequences of a grid imposed on a continuous market have not been explored 
experimentally and an accepted theory of market adjustment in the presence of a grid does not 
exist in the literature. However, peeks at the possible consequences occur here and there.  The 
absence of a body of theory and experiment motivates the investigation of market conditions to 
ascertain if anyone has a disproportionate impact and, if so, to pursue the analysis in greater 
depth.  
          The grid is a form of price restriction that can induce surprising behavior.  For example, 
the grid has similarities with price ceilings and floors that are known to induce special forms of 
behavior e.g., prices can equilibrate bounded away from bounding constraints (Hatfield, et.al. 
(GEB 2016), Isaac and Plott (AER 1981), Smith and Williams (Handbook p.46)); removal of 
bounding constraints can cause explosive behavior.  The experimental design respects known 
patterns of “grid-like” institutions in the sense that it is structured to explore how markets with 
grids behave relative to well-established patterns of market behaviors.            
          All experiments were conducted on the internet.  Experiments used an artificial currency 
called “francs”.  The conversion to dollars depended on the scaling of the francs, which differed 
across experiments.  The parameters were set such that at equilibrium the subject would earn 
about $4.50 per period if the market was 100% efficient. 
          Two different series of experiments were conducted. The first series consisted of a total of 
seven experiments, all of which used very similar demand and supply functions and differed 
primarily according to the scaling of units, the size of the grid and when and if the grid was 
imposed. Induced values were for certain amounts known with certainty to the participant. The 
second series consisted of six experiments with common values, limited private information 
about the common value and whether or not a grid was imposed.  
 
6:  SERIES 1: CLASSICAL INDUCED, PRIVATE VALUES PREFERENCES 
Following frequently used procedures, the preferences were financially induced 
separately for each of the several periods. Sellers acquire the units for sale by buying the units at 
fixed prices made available by the experimenter in the seller’s private market. The seller keeps 
the difference between the price of a unit paid by the buyer to the seller and the price at which 
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seller purchased the unit from the experimenter. Buyers make money by buying in the market 
from sellers and selling acquired units at fixed prices made available by the experimenter in the 
buyer’s private market. The buyer keeps the difference between the price of a unit paid to the 
seller and the price received for the unit from the experimenter. 
Market demands and supplies are derived from the induced preferences in a natural way.   
The potential cost to the seller of acquiring units from the experimenter, the individual seller’s 
marginal costs, can be configured into a market supply curve.  
 Experiments 20160212, 20160224, 20160307 and 20160507 were performed with 
Caltech undergraduates as subjects.  Experiments 20160325, 20160329 and 20160331 were 
conducted remotely with Purdue undergraduates as subjects. Differences in laboratory facilities, 
subtle difference in instruction, procedures, software and subjects could be responsible for subtle 
differences detected in the data. 
            Periods lasted from 8 minutes to 14 minutes depending on the number of participants.  
The number of participants had a natural impact on volume and the time required for orderly 
market adjustments. For an individual, the induced preferences were the same for all periods, 
except the first period, which was used for instruction and training.  Preferences were not public 
and the fact that they were unchanging was not public.  
The only difference among periods within an experiment was the existence of the grid 
and the size of the grid differed across experiments.  In Series 1 the grid was 250 for some 
experiments and 20 for others.   
             Table 1 lists the size of the grid for each period of each experiment.   As can be seen, 
some experiments start with a “large” grid for several periods after which the grid is reduced to 
1.  In other experiments, the experiment starts with a grid equal to 1 for several periods after 
which a larger grid is imposed.  These manipulations are intended to provide insights about the 
impact of a grid and about grid size; they also open the possibility of observing any dramatic 
changes in equilibrium or equilibration due to experience with and without a grid, should such be 
an impact of the grid. 
          Individual preferences are always one of 8 “types”.  The letter B indicates one of four 
buyer types and the S indicates one of four sellers’ types. The numbers associated with a “type”, 
e.g. B1 or S2, identify parameters that are linear transformations of a common base.  Thus, the 
parameters across experiments in the same series differ only by linear transformations (origin 
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and scale) in the sense that all buyers and sellers in an experiment are related to the base by a 
common linear transformation.  The scale is used for the selection of different grids across 
experiments.  Period 1, always a practice period, has a special set of instructional parameters. 
The preference types for each of the experiments of Series 1 are listed in Table 1. The complete 
list of all parameters in all experiments is in the Appendix.      
          All parameters for experiments in series one are similar and as shown in Figure 1.  Market 
demands and supplies were linear, given the integer constraint with “kinks”.  There is a slight 
difference in demand and supply slopes beyond the competitive equilibrium in selected 
experiments. This was done to increase the excess demand and supplies at grid prices.   
          The location of the competitive equilibrium price in the parameters was always near the 
middle between two grid prices.  When the grid was greater than one the theoretical competitive 
equilibrium was always bounded away from a grid price and thus the CE did not exist. 
            Table 1: Experiments, periods, grids, types 
Experiment  Periods Grid Type  B1 B3 B5 B7 S2 S4 S6 S8 
20160212 
[2,6] 250 
Number 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
[1][7-11] 1 
 
  
        
20160224 
[2,6] 250 
2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 
[1][7-11] 1 
 
  
        
20160307 
[2,7] 250 
2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 
[1][8-12] 1 
 
  
        
20160325 
[2,6] 250 
2 0 2 1 2 1 2 1 
[1][7-10] 1 
 
  
        
20160329 
[2,7] 250 
3 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 
[1][8-10] 1 
 
  
        
20160331 
[2,5] 250 
3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 
[1][6-10] 1 
 
  
        
20160507 
[1,6] 250 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
[7-12] 1 
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7. SERIES ONE RESULTS 
The experiments in the classical, private values environment address two broad classes of 
results.  First, what is the impact of a price grid?  Secondly, which model best captures market 
behavior in the presence of price grid? A third class of issues is related to the impact of a grid on 
the use of information but this type of question is best studied with the Series Two experiments.  
 
7.1 Series 1 Private Value Results: Overview Example 
An overview of the pattern of the data from an experiment can be found in Figure 3 
below. Price is on the vertical axis and time is measured on the horizontal wtih vertical dotted 
lines that separate periods. The first period is a practicing period without grid. After that, we 
implement a price grid and the bids, asks and trades all happen at the grid. In the first several 
periods, bids and asks are  
 
Figure 3: Data from Session 1 Experiment 20160329 
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distributed sparsely, while as time goes by they are more concentrated at the bounding grids 
around the CE price. As predicted by the assignment model, trading prices bounce between the 
two bounding grids as a feature of stable assignment. After the grid is removed in Period 8, the 
prices soon fall inside the bounding grids and a convergence to the CE price is observed.  
 
7.2. Equilibration: Observed market equilibration is consistent with the stable assignment market 
model. 
 
           Equilibration involves the dynamic properties of individual contracts in contrast to 
equilibrium, which is based on the static concept of a stable assignment. The distinction is subtle. 
While an assignment is a collection of contracts, the contracts themselves have the capacity to 
dissolve and reform and in an empirical sense can be interpreted as stable or unstable.  Thus, we 
focus on the empirical stability of contracts and properties that endure over time. We note that an 
assignment can only be empirically stable if and only if the associated contracts are empirically 
stable.  
          Empirically stable contracts are based on prices that repeatedly emerge and become 
implemented after previously formed contracts at those prices have ended by the natural 
progression of time.
9
  At the end of a period, all contracts are automatically broken. Empirically 
stable contracts involve prices that become part of reformulated contracts and are implemented 
in another period.  Empirically unstable contracts are those with prices that do not become part 
of new contracts.  Instability of a contract occurs if one side of the contracting pair does not offer 
or declines the terms of the previous contract when offered.  In operational terms, empirical 
instability of a contract is when only one side or neither side of a previously successful contract 
returns to the contract price (a buy offer or a sell offer of the terms found in previous contacts). If 
an offer is made the other side does not respond by taking the offer.  Instability can be detected 
in terms of unaccepted bids and asks at previous contract prices. 
          Participants who find better partners do not return to previous contract levels and are not 
part of attempts to form contracts on previous terms.  On the other hand, those who cannot find 
better opportunities return to the previous contract prices and try to establish contracts with 
                                           
9
 The dynamics is similar to the process of “recontracting” postulated by Edgeworth where the recontracting takes 
place at designated times and need not involve the same agents. 
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offers (bids and asks) of previous terms.   As offers fail to be accepted those making the offers 
initiate new offers that are worse for themselves but better for a possible counter-party.  
The identification of empirical stability of contracts in the data follows the discussion 
above. Since only contract price is relevant, we classify the contracts according to whether 
contracts reform or unravel at the same price in next period. Specifically, if we find no bids or 
asks at the contract price in next period then the contract is denoted as a two-side unraveling 
contract. If we find only one side returns, namely only bids or asks at the price in the next period, 
the contract is denoted as a one-side unraveling contract. If both bids and asks occur in the next 
period, the contract is reformulated and denoted as an empirically stable contract.  
According to the prediction of the assignment model, the stable set only contains contracts 
at the two bounding grids. Consider sellers and buyers who have assignments above the upper 
bounding gird. The next period the seller (or some seller) would return to that price with an ask 
but buyers, having observed contracts at lower prices, would not respond with an accepting bid 
(a “takeask”).  The assignment at that price would not be stable (empirically) because one of the 
parties would like to return but the other does not.  Similarly, a contract below the lower 
bounding grid would unravel.  The next period the buyer (or some buyer) would bid at that price 
wanting to return to the partnership (contract) but there would be no take-bid coming from the 
sellers who can find a better deal.  Contracts will unravel at non-bounding grids and appear at the 
bounding grids as a convergence process.  
The phenomena are described in Result 1. As indicated by the example above, the one sided 
nature of the dynamics of an unstable contract helps provide an intuition about price movement.  
Instability is mostly one-side unraveling rather than two sided.  Typically, one side finds a better 
contract and does not want to return while the other side was not able to find a favorable 
alternative and wants to return to the old contract. The summary statistics (Panel D of Table 2) 
show that it is actually the case. Two-side unraveling contracts account for only 4% of all the 
contracts across all experiments, compared to 23% for one-side unraveling contracts. 
 
Result 1.  (i) The non-bounding grid prices are empirically unstable and (ii) empirically stable 
contract prices converge to the bounding grids.                                                                 
Support.   To show that contracts at the non-bounding prices are unstable, we consider three 
different price groups (i) contracts at prices above the upper bounding grid, (ii) contracts at 
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prices below the lower bounding grid and (iii) contracts at the bounding price grids. Also, to be 
complete, we check the quantity of each type of contract at the upper bounding grid, at the lower 
bounding grid, one or two grids above the upper bounding grid and one or two grids below the 
lower bounding grid. Very few contracts exist at farther grids.  
The summary statistics (Table 2) show that there are fewer empirically stable contracts at non-
bounding grids than at the two bounding grids. For contracts at the bounding grids, the 
percentage of empirically stable contracts is 84%, much greater than 56% for contracts at prices 
higher than the bounding grids and 16% for the contracts at prices lower than the bounding grids. 
In addition, the absolute number of empirically stable contracts is also larger at bounding grids 
than non-bounding grids (459 vs. 94), despite the fact that the bounding grids only contain two 
prices while the non-bounding grids could be at any other prices.  
The pattern that stable contracts are more likely to be found at bounding grids persists when we 
check each price level separately. According to Table 2 Panel A, the percentage of stable 
contracts over all contracts at upper bounding grid and lower bounding grid both exceed 80%. 
While at one grid above the upper bound (Table 2 Panel B), the fraction falls to 68% and at one 
grid below the lower bound (Table 2 Panel C), it falls to only 29%. For two grids away from the 
bounding grids, only 50% contracts are stable at price greater than the upper bound (Table 2 
Panel B) and only 11% contracts are stable at price lower than the lower bound (Table 2 Panel 
C).  
 
 
       Table 2: Summary statistics of contracts by type and price 
Panel A: Price at bounding grids 
 
At upper grid At lower grid Total 
Contract type Quantity Percent (%) Quantity Percent (%) Quantity Percent (%) 
Two-side 
unraveling 
3 1% 3 1% 6 1% 
One-side 
unraveling 
43 15% 40 15% 83 15% 
Stable 238 84% 221 84% 459 84% 
Total 284 100% 264 100% 548 100% 
              
 Panel B: Price greater than bounding grids 
 
One grid greater Two grids greater Total 
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Contract type Quantity Percent (%) Quantity Percent (%) Quantity Percent (%) 
Two-side 
unraveling 
0 0% 1 8% 10 6% 
One-side 
unraveling 
35 32% 5 42% 59 38% 
Stable 76 68% 6 50% 87 56% 
Total 111 100% 12 100% 156 100% 
              
Panel C: Price smaller than bounding grids 
 
One grid smaller Two grids smaller Total 
Contract type Quantity Percent (%) Quantity Percent (%) Quantity Percent (%) 
Two-side 
unraveling 
0 0% 1 11% 8 19% 
One-side 
unraveling 
15 71% 7 78% 28 65% 
Stable 6 29% 1 11% 7 16% 
Total 21 100% 9 100% 43 100% 
       Panel D: All prices 
 
  
Total 
Contract type 
    
Quantity* Percent (%) 
Two-side 
unraveling     
27 4% 
One-side 
unraveling     
170 23% 
Stable 
    
553 74% 
Total 
    
750 100% 
 
*There are three contracts signed at prices in between the bounding grids due to system 
mistake. So total quantity of two-side unraveling contracts is 27=6+10+8+3 
        
Contracts at non-bounding prices are unstable since they fail to reappear in next period. 
As a convergence process, empirically stable contract prices tend to be at the two bounding grids 
in later periods. To show the trend statistically, we apply the Ashenfelter-El-Gamal (AEIG) test
10
 
to analyze the effect of time: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵11𝐷1 (
1
𝑡
) + 𝐵12𝐷2 (
1
𝑡
) + ⋯ + 𝐵1𝑖𝐷𝑖 (
1
𝑡
) + ⋯ + 𝐵1𝑛𝐷𝑛 (
1
𝑡
) + 𝐵2 (
𝑡 − 1
𝑡
) + 𝑢 
where 𝑖 indicates the particular experiment, 𝑡 represents time as measured by market periods in 
the experiment, 𝐷𝑖 is a dummy variable that takes 1 for experiment  𝑖 and 0 otherwise and  𝐵1𝑖 is 
the origin of a possible convergence process. Notice that if 𝑡 = 1 then value of the dependent 
                                           
10
 Plott et al 1995 AER.  
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variable is equal to  𝐵1𝑖 for experiment 𝑖.  𝐵2 is the asymptote of the dependent variable. As 𝑡 
gets large the weight of 𝐵1𝑖 is small because 
1
𝑡
 approaches zero while the weight of 𝐵2 
approaches 1. Notice that 𝐵2 is common to all experiments. Finally, 𝑢 is the random error term 
that is distributed normally with mean zero.  
To make comparison across experiments and pool the data, we look at contracts at 
different price levels or belong to different price groups (above, below and at the bounding 
grids), without referring to the exact contract price, whose magnitude varies in different 
experiments. We also construct an indicator of stability of contracts for each price group, 
measured by the proportion of empirically stable contracts over all contracts in a given period. 
What we want to show is that, stability of contracts at non-bounding prices decreases over time, 
while stability of contracts at bounding grids increases or remains high.  
Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients from the AEIG test. In panel A we group the 
contracts according to whether the price is at, greater than or lower than the bounding grids. As 
indicated by the estimation of coefficients, stability at the bounding grids stays at very high level. 
In all experiment, it starts at a minimum of 61.9% and converges to 90.8%, with all the estimated 
coefficients significant at 99% level. For the group of contracts with prices above the bounding 
grids, there is a decreasing trend of stability for 5 out of 7 experiments. For example, the 
estimated coefficient starts at 87.5% in experiment 2 and converges to 42.4% in the end. For the 
group of contracts with prices below the bounding grids, there is no obvious trend since the 
coefficients are not statistically significant, but stability stays low for all the experiments (the 
highest level is 35.8% in experiment 1 and it ends at 38.6%). 
 
           Table 3: Coefficient estimates for AEIG model 
 
B_11 B_12 B_13 B_14 B_15 B_16 B_17 B_2 n R^2 
 
          Panel A: Stability at pooling prices 
Stability at the 
bounding grids 
0.880*** 0.826*** 1.005*** 0.891*** 0.964*** 0.747*** 0.619*** 0.908*** 54 0.942 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.19) (0.14) (0.19) (0.14) (0.12) (0.06) 
             Stability above the 
bounding grids 
0.83 0.875** 1.165*** 0 0.559*** 0.567 -0.6 0.424** 33 0.666 
(0.79) (0.38) (0.39) (0.32) (0.19) (0.34) (0.88) (0.19) 
             Stability below the 0.358 -0.386 0.241 -0.0236 -1.157 0 
 
0.386 16 0.429 
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bounding grids 
(0.26) (0.85) (0.27) (0.23) (1.81) (0.40) 
 
(0.28) 
  
 
          Panel B: Stability at separate prices 
Stability at the upper 
bounding grid 
1.060*** 0.748*** 1.058*** 0.906*** 1.062*** 0.913*** 1.015*** 0.775*** 29 0.955 
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.08) 
             Stability at the lower 
bounding grid 
0.705*** 0.908*** 0.983*** 0.880*** 0.474 0.584*** 0.650*** 1.031*** 27 0.976 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.41) (0.15) (0.15) (0.07) 
             Stability at the upper 
bounding grid + 1 grid 
0.613 0.958** 1.107*** 0 1.017** 0.867** -0.835 0.590** 19 0.868 
(0.68) (0.33) (0.33) (0.38) (0.33) (0.33) (0.76) (0.20) 
             Stability at the lower 
bounding grid - 1 grid 
0.451 -0.59 0.346 -1.77 -1.77 0 
 
0.59 10 0.57 
(0.55) (1.30) (0.54) (2.86) (2.86) (0.59) 
 
(0.54) 
             Stability at the upper 
bounding grid + 2 
grids 
   
0 1.133 -0.333 
 
0.333 6 0.822 
   
(0.52) (0.50) (1.16) 
 
(0.53) 
             Stability at the lower 
bounding grid - 2 
grids 
0.333 
 
0 0 
   
-0.333 4 1 
0.00  
 
0.00  0.00  
   
0.00  
                        
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      
 
 
In panel B, we examine each price level separately. Consistent with panel A, at the two 
bounding grids, the measure of stability either stays high throughout all periods or displays an 
increasing trend. For contracts at a price one grid greater than the bounding grid, the stability 
decreases over time in 5 out of 7 experiments. As showed by the coefficients, for example in 
experiment 2, the proportion of stable contracts starts at 95.8% and converges to only 59.0%. 
The coefficients are generally insignificant and indistinguishable from 0 for the three other price 
levels (1 grid lower than the lower bounding grid and 2 grids away from the bounding grids).  
Overall, the data support the dynamic movements stated as Result 1.  The test results 
confirm that there is a trend that non-bounding grids are empirically unstable contract prices and 
empirically stable contract prices converge to the bounding grids.   
We now establish the link between stable contracts and stable matches suggested by 
theory.  Result 2 illustrates that the repeated contracts we observe until the end of the experiment 
(empirically stable contracts) are the stable matches predicted by theory. 
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Unstable assignments are revealed by unsuccessful attempts to reestablish them while 
stable assignments are visibly successful.  The stability defined in Result 1 is based on whether a 
contract reforms or not. In fact, the theory developed in previous section also makes predictions 
about the set of stable outcomes. According to section 4, contracts in a stable match must have 
two properties.  (1) Stable contracts must be priced at two bounding grids (no blocking pair) and 
(2) stable contracts must be profitable to both sides (individual rationality). Therefore, we can 
identify whether a contract is in the theoretical stable set using the same criteria.  
The first criterion is easily checked, since we can directly compare the price of each 
contract with the bounding grids. The second criterion requires supplementary information, since 
the traders’ profits are not specified in the contract. As buyers’ values are determined by the 
prices, they sell to the experiments in the private market and sellers’ costs are determined by the 
prices they buy from the experiments in the private market, we can track the redemption value 
and cost of each unit and associate them with each contract with the time of trade execution. In 
the end, a contract is deemed to be in the stable set if it is priced at the bounding grids, the 
redemption value is higher than the contract price, and the cost is lower than the contract price. 
Besides the stable outcome, during the converging process, there will also be unstable 
matches that will eventually disappear. Also, since we don’t restrict the direction of trading in 
the public market, participants could trade on both sides of the market in an attempt to speculate. 
When the trading prices are bouncing between two equilibrium grids, speculators in theory could 
make a profit if they buy at the lower bounding grid and sell at the higher bounding grid. 
Therefore, we don’t necessarily anticipate that speculative contracts will completely disappear 
with time.  
The primary research interest is to test the explanatory power of matching model in the 
market environment with price grids. The major prediction of the model is the stable outcome. If 
the theory is the proper principle in the market with grids, the stable contracts we observed 
should be elements in the stable outcome. Hence, we want to test whether the empirical stable 
contracts are consistent with the theoretical prediction. The finding is summarized in result 2. 
 
Result 2. Empirically stable contracts converge into the stable outcome predicted by the theory. 
Support:  From the data, we observe mainly two types of contracts, stable and unraveling 
contracts, defined by whether they reform in next period or not. On the theoretical side, we 
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define three sets of contracts, the stable set (stable outcome), unstable set and speculative set. 
Each contract in the data should have both an empirical identification and a theoretical 
identification. Result 2 states the prediction that the empirically stable contracts fall into the 
theoretically stable set as the outcome of convergence.  
Below is a table (Table 4) that summarizes quantity of each type of contract pooling all 
experiments. Putting aside the speculative set, we find that more (empirical) unraveling contracts 
fall into the (theoretical) unstable set than the stable set (88 vs. 32) while more empirically stable 
contracts fall into the stable set (229 vs. 134). Alternatively, stated in the opposite way, the 
contracts predicted stable by the theory are more likely to reform in the experiment, while those 
predicted to be unstable are more likely to disappear.  
      Table 4: Empirical and theoretical stable contracts 
 
 
Theoretical 
 
 
Unstable set Stable set Speculative set Total 
Empirical 
Unraveling 88 32 87 207 
Stable 134 229 194 557 
Total 222 261 281 764 
 
Combining the empirical and theoretical identifications, all contracts could be assigned 
into one of the six categories: unraveling contracts in the unstable set, unraveling contracts in the 
stable set, unraveling contracts in the speculative set, stable contracts in the unstable set, stable 
contracts in the stable set and stable contracts in the speculative set. What we care more about is 
the trend of change. In order to pool the data of all the experiments and compare across different 
periods, we use proportion instead of absolute number to measure the likelihood that a contract 
observed in the experiment falls into a set. Our primary interest is to see among all the stable 
contracts how many fall into the stable set. Hence, we calculate the percentage of stable contracts 
in the stable set over all the stable contracts. The Ashenfelter-El-Gamal test is applied to test the 
trend. To make a comparison, we also test the trend of changes of stable contracts in other sets. 
As showed by Table 5, the proportion of stable contracts in the stable set displays an increasing 
trend in all experiments except experiment 2 (160224). For example, it starts at 26.5% in 
experiment 1 (160212) and converges to 65.7% in the end. In experiment 2, it starts at 70.8%, a 
very high level and stays high until the end. Contrary to the stable set, stable contracts in the 
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unstable set experience an obvious declining trend. It starts at 67.5% over all stable contracts in 
experiment 1 and ends up at 17.1%. The stable contracts in speculative set show a mixed trend. 
The percentage decreases over time in experiments 160325, 160329 and 160331, (4, 5 and 6, 
respectively) and increases but stays low in all other experiments. In conclusion, the contracts 
repeatedly observed in the experiments mostly come from the stable outcome predicted by the 
matching theory.  
           Table 5: Trend of stable contracts in theoretical sets 
 
B_11 B_12 B_13 B_14 B_15 B_16 B_17 B_2 n R^2 
 
          Stable contracts in 
the stable set 
0.265 0.708*** 0.363* 0.0941 -0.132 0.138 0.0831** 0.657*** 29 0.86 
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.04) (0.10) 
  
 
          Stable contracts in 
the unstable set 
0.675*** 0.311*** 0.733*** 0.147 0.308*** 0.175 0.00176 0.171*** 29 0.9 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.02) (0.05) 
  
 
          Stable contracts in 
the speculative set 
0.0673 -0.0135 -0.0877 0.766*** 0.833*** 0.693*** 0.00884 0.157** 29 0.887 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) -0.0217 (0.06) 
                        
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
            
The focus now becomes the cases in which the competitive equilibrium price does exist. 
The next two results report features of contract prices as compared to competitive equilibrium 
prices.  Given the discrete nature of incentives, the competitive equilibrium prices form a range 
of prices we will designate as the competitive equilibrium price range, CER.  We will explore the 
relationship between average contract prices in a period and the CER.  The first of the two 
experiments examines periods without grids, so the competitive equilibrium price range is a 
natural result.  The second experiment has an imposed grid and contract prices cannot equal the 
competitive equilibrium prices.  However, the range of prices can be computed from the 
parameters and will be called the Virtual Competitive Equilibrium - the VCE.  For each period, 
we calculate the average price of completed trades, denoted Average Transaction Price (ATP). 
Then we ascertain whether the ATP lies within the interval of prices defined by the VCE.   
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Result 3 reveals that prices approach the interval (range) of competitive equilibrium 
prices. This property emerges when the grids do not exist, which is sometimes imposed when the 
market opens and when the grids are removed after having been in place for a number of periods. 
The second result, Result 4, tells us that that the ATP is close to the VCE when grids are in 
place. 
 
Result 3. When the CE, the Competitive Equilibrium, exists (including an allowance for 
transactions costs) the CE prices emerge as contract prices. The emergence occurs when grids do 
not exist at the market opening and when previously existing grids are removed.   
Support.  The grids and units differ across experiments so the patterns are most easily seen in 
terms of the error of the model. If the average price is within the interval defined by the CE 
range, then the price converges perfectly and we denote the error as being zero. If the average 
price is not in the interval, then we calculate the difference between the average price and the 
competitive equilibrium price range and scale it across experiments by dividing it by the average 
price. 
 An Ashenfelter-El-Gamal test demonstrates that the difference between ATP and CE 
price range shrinks with time. As shown in table 6, coefficients for the starting period in 
experiments 1 to 6 are not statistically different from 0, meaning that when the grids are removed 
the ATP falls into the set of competitive equilibrium prices immediately.  An exception is 
experiment 7, which had no grid imposed and that began with no information about the bounding 
grids.  In that experiment, the AEIG test shows a clear declining trend of ATP from the CE 
ending at 1.12% in the last period, which is statistically indistinguishable from 0. 
In addition to the deviation of ATP, we also present how the variation of prices changes 
over time. The measure we use is the relative standard deviation of price. As the AEIG test 
shows, for experiments 160212, 160224. 160307 and 160507 (respectively 1,2,3 and 7), there is 
a clear trend that the variation of prices decreases. Combining this with the fact that ATP is close 
to the CE, we conclude that contract prices converge to CE in general.  
           Table 6: Deviation of ATP from VCE 
 
B_11 B_12 B_13 B_14 B_15 B_16 B_17 B_2 n R^2 
           
|ATP-VCE|/ATP 
0.0323 0.0198 0.0241 0.00167 -0.0026 0.00689 0.253*** 0.0112 33 0.847 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
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           Relative standard 
deviation of price 
0.0645* 0.131*** 0.0764** 0.02  0.01  0.03  0.0859** 0.0337** 33 0.721 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) 
                        
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      
The next result, Result 4, is focused on experiments in which the price grid is imposed 
and asks about the information content of the average transaction price, the ATC. Although a 
competitive equilibrium does not exist due to price restrictions, the Virtual Competitive 
Equilibrium does exist and is positioned where the CE would exist should there be no price grid.   
Result 4 has two parts. The first part states that the ATP converges close to the VCE. The second 
part demonstrates that the VCE is a better predictor of the ATP than is the midpoint of the 
bounding grid prices. 
 
Result 4.  When a price grid is in place (i) average transaction prices (ATP) converge to the 
VCE and (ii) the VCE is a better predictor of the ATP than is the midpoint of the bounding grid 
prices (ABP). 
Support.  Table 7 presents the deviations of ATP from VCE and ABP. We define the Average 
Boundary Price (ABP) to be the arithmetic average of the two bounding grid prices at the 
equilibrium.  We compare the convergence of the ATP to the VCE with the convergence of the 
ATP to the ABP.  
         Table 7: Convergence of ATP with price grids 
         Period* Experiment (indicated by date) 
 
160212 160224 160307 160325 160329 160331 160507 Average 
 
Panel A: |ATP-VCE|/ATP 
1         
2 0.0% 0.0% 3.4% 0.0% 7.6% 4.0% 0.3% 2.2% 
3 5.5% 0.9% 2.9% 0.0% 3.8% 0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 
4 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.4% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 
5 2.2% 1.5% 0.5% 1.8% 1.8% 
 
0.0% 1.3% 
6 
  
0.0% 
 
0.0% 
 
0.0% 0.0% 
         
 
Panel B: |ABP-VCE|/ATP 
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1 
  
      
2 1.5% 2.1% 7.1% 2.9% 2.5% 6.7% 0.9% 3.4% 
3 7.2% 0.6% 6.7% 5.4% 1.5% 1.9% 0.9% 3.4% 
4 0.0% 1.7% 1.9% 0.6% 5.2% 0.7% 0.4% 1.5% 
5 4.1% 0.0% 2.3% 1.2% 8.4% 
 
0.6% 2.8% 
6     2.8%   6.1%   0.0% 3.0% 
 
* Periods are relabeled by order of time. The number of periods varies across experiments. The first 
periods were practice periods are not included as part of the data  
 
 
Figure 4: Convergence of average price 
 
Figure 4 depicts the convergence of average price by pooling the data across different 
experiments. With the exception of period 2, the ATP is always closer to VCE than it is to the 
ABP. The difference between the ATP and VCE disappears by period 6. 
 
7.3. Speculation, volume and liquidity  
Results 1 through 4 establish that the major pricing features of the stable sets emerge and 
that those features are better predictors than the competitive model.  The stable assignments also 
involve specific predictions about the set of agents that will emerge in the market matches that 
can be used as tools to understand market behaviors.  However, all predictions become clouded 
by the possibility of speculation, liquidity supply and other market behaviors suggested by the 
literature and by policy controversies.  
0.0%
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3.0%
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Result 5.  Grid increases volume because speculation subsidizes trade through losses to 
speculators. 
Support: The parameters change across experiments. For each separate experiment, since the 
number of participants and preference parameters may differ, the predicted volume of trades and 
other activities can be different. However, within each experiment, the parameters do not change 
whether or not a grid exists. This allows us to make a comparison of average trades and 
speculation in each experiment period by partitioning the data according to the existence of a 
grid.  
Table 8 presents t-tests on the average contracts and speculation per trader in the markets 
with and without a price grid. In general, the sign of the differences confirm that grid attracts 
more volume and the increased volume arises partially because of speculation.  
The fact that grid invites more speculation means that the grid serves as a central 
mechanism to attract excess demand and supply. Define those participants who always trade on 
the right side of the market given their induced values as fundamentalists.   That is, the 
fundamentalists are sellers who never attempt to buy in the public market and buyers who never 
attempt to sell in the public market. By contrast, speculators are defined conversely as sellers 
who buy order or buyers who sell. According to table 8, when the grid exists there are more 
fundamentalists trading in the market and there are also more active speculative activities.  Thus, 
there is increased overall trade volume when the grid exists. In general, a larger tick size attracts 
speculators by signaling a larger profit opportunity due to the price grid. Speculators bring more 
trade volume not only because they trade with both sides of the market, but also because they 
tend to hang onto inventory by the end of the experiment due to bad management. This 
introduces additional demand and supply, which arises despite speculators’ losses.  
 
Table 8: Relationship between grid and volume 
 
Without Grid 
 
With Grid 
 
Diff [w/o grid-w/ grid] 
 
N Mean 
Confidence 
Interval  
 
N Mean Confidence Interval  
 
Mean Confidence Interval  
           Average 
contracts 
32 
3.36 
 [3.10, 3.62] 
 
37 
3.59 
 [3.29, 3.89] 
 
-0.23 
[-0.62, 0.17] 
(0.13) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.20) 
         Average 
speculation 
0.48 
 [0.25, 0.71] 
 
0.60 
[0.33, 0.86] 
 
-0.12 
[-0.47, 0.24] 
(0.11) 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.18) 
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7.4. Efficiencies  
A natural test of efficiency follows after the examination of volume. Since most of extra 
volume caused by grid comes from the inefficient supply and demand, the stable assignment 
model predicts the possibility of a decreased social welfare due to the introduction of the grid. 
 
Result 6.  The grid decreases efficiency (efficiency increases with period and decreases with 
grid) 
Support. The underlying economic parameters are the same whether or not a grid is in place.  
Thus, from a technical point of view, total achievable surplus is identical with or without the 
grid. Similarly, the efficient allocation is included as an element of the set of stable matches 
when the grid is in place. However, because the efficient allocation is only one of the many 
equilibria when the grid is in place and there is no mechanism that naturally guides exchanges 
between specific partners, maximal surplus is achieved with grid due to sheer luck. Nevertheless, 
one could define a minimal surplus achievable when all subjects outside of the grid trade and 
nobody else does. This corresponds to subjects with two-colored dashed lines in figure 2. 
Sometimes subjects carry a leftover inventory at the end of the experiment, which clearly 
decreases their profit. Therefore, when calculating the social surplus, we adjust the data 
assuming that any purchases from the experimenter that resulted in a leftover inventory have no 
effect on social surplus, 
We perform a regression on adjusted surplus by date, the existence of grid, and different 
periods using the model:  
Adjusted Surplus = β0+ β1* Grid + βperiod* Period + βdate* Date. 
The existence of grid is associated with loss in surplus at a significance level of 0.052 as can be 
seen from the second line of the table. Furthermore, each period is also associated with a gain in 
surplus at a significance level of 0.04 as can be seen from the third line of table 9. 
 
Table 9: Factors affecting social surplus 
Coefficients Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
GridY -307.25 154.75 -1.986 0.0517 . 
Period 55.95 27.09 2.066 0.0432 * 
Date160224 -161.16 243.81 -0.661 0.5112 
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Date160307 3649.17 232.32 15.708 <2e-16 *** 
Date160325 -10714.4 243.81 -43.947 <2e-16 *** 
Date160329 -9222.93 244.5 -37.722 <2e-16 *** 
Date160331 -9612.09 2344.32 -39.342 <2e-16 *** 
Date160507 -10009.38 232.32 -43.473 <2e-16 *** 
(Intercept) 13094.92 282.58 46.34 <2e-16 *** 
 
We can see that the existence of grid does indeed decrease social surplus. The efficiency 
converges to 100% when there is no grid. When there is grid, the result is mixed. For Caltech 
subjects and experienced Purdue subjects, the efficiency is very close to the maximum. For 
inexperienced Purdue subjects, we observe a very low starting level of efficiency. Efficiency 
converges to around 95% with the grid when pooled across experiments. We can compare this 
with efficiency converging close to 100% in the absence of grid. 
Other data that supports the idea that a grid leads to increased unwelcome liquidity is that 
the number of speculative trades is positively correlated with fundamental trades. When we 
perform a regression on the number of fundamental trades to speculations with the model: 
Fundamental trades = β0+ β1* speculation + β2* Number of subjects 
We observe a significant positive correlation between the two at a significance level of 0.02 as 
can be seen from the first row of the table. 
     Table 10: Speculative contracts increase fundamental trades 
Coefficients Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
Speculative contracts 0.10829 0.04526 2.393 0.0196 * 
Subjects 1.2637 0.06852 18.443 <2e-16 *** 
(Intercept) 1.83665 0.77188 2.379 0.0203 * 
 
This suggests that as speculators engage in trades, there are outstanding bids and asks that 
attract otherwise inefficient units and traders into the market.  Profit opportunities are created for 
units that would be excluded in an efficient market. Therefore, the total number of fundamental 
trades is positively correlated with speculative trades, which are in turn negatively correlated 
with social surplus. 
 
8.  SERIES TWO: SECURITIES WTIH UNCERTAIN PAYOFF AND ASYMMETRIC 
INFORMATION 
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The previous sections highlight the importance of assignment principles in the dynamics 
of price adjustment.  This section expands the scope by allowing limited and heterogeneous 
information across agents.  The asset now pays a common dividend about which each individual 
has only a small amount of information; indeed, information about the dividend is quite limited 
even after it is aggregated across agents. 
It is well known that individuals with asymmetric information can improve their 
knowledge through market interactions.  If and how that phenomena might survive the 
imposition of a grid are central questions. In unconstrained markets, the vehicles carrying 
information are known to be the bids, asks and contracts. The number and structure of the 
markets are known to be important. Speculation can play a role as information creates the 
opportunity for arbitrage and thus prices can carry motivations and beliefs unrelated to private 
information about states, such as beliefs about the behavior of others.   The competitive 
equilibrium plays a central role in this process. However, much of that institutional and 
behavioral support might be called into question when grids are present.  The questions posed 
here are to what extent does the information aggregation features of markets remain if a grid is 
imposed and whether matching theory holds tools for understanding what emerges. 
 
 
 
 
8.1 Experimental design 
 
In the experiments with uncertainty a total of six experimental sessions were conducted 
with eight subjects recruited from the Caltech undergraduate and graduate student populations. 
Each experimental session had twelve independent periods including a first practice period. 
Three experimental sessions were conducted with a grid imposed and three experimental 
sessions were conducted without a grid. In experiments with a grid, subjects were only allowed 
to trade in increments of 10. 
 
Table 11 Session 2: Experiments with common value 
Experimental sessions 
with grid 
Number of 
periods 
Experimental sessions 
with No grid 
Number of periods 
Session 1: 20170804 12 Session 4: 20170811 12  same as 1 
Session 2: 20170807 12 Session 5: 20170810 12  same as 2 
Session 3: 20170808 12 Session 6: 20170809 12  same as 3 
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Prior to the opening of a period, each subject was given private information about the 
probability of the dividend that period. Each subject started with four units of the commodity in 
each period. Negative inventories, short sales, were allowed only up to -1. In addition to the 
initial endowment of securities, the subjects also started with a 4,000 francs loan, which was 
repaid at the end of each period.  Each unit of the commodity paid a single dividend per unit to 
the holder that was the same across all holders. The dividend paid per unit at the end of the 
period, was randomly determined each period from a uniform distribution between 100 and 400. 
After each period ended, the value of the dividend was revealed.  For comparison across 
experiments, the values of the dividend and the corresponding private signals were identical 
across sessions 1 and 4, sessions 2 and 5, and sessions 3 and 6.  
The information about the dividend was determined by the same process for all 
experiments. Each subject received a private signal drawn from a truncated normal distribution 
(σ=60) centered around the dividend. Each participant was given a personalized table with the 
Bayesian posterior odds calculated for each bin of value. Subjects’ ability to perform probability 
updating is not a variable. The draws and the information are contained in an appendix. 
Figure 5 illustrates the data and order flow produced in a market with a grid. Several 
features are of interest and will be addressed later. Sell orders are red and buy orders are blue. 
Contracts are the large circles.  Periods are separated by the vertical lines.  A grid is in place and 
is shown as the horizontal lines that become the locations of all market activity.  The figure 
reveals that contracts are signed at more widely scattered prices in the early stage of each period. 
A closer look at the data reveals that the ratio between number of orders to the number of 
contracts changes within a period. Bids and asks come in the market as participants attempt to 
trade. In the early stage when subjects have limited knowledge, more options have to be 
provided as a process of search for someone willing to take bid or ask and sign the contract. In 
the later stages, if an equilibrium emerges, traders can avoid meaningless attempts and issue bids 
and asks that are more likely to be taken. As a result, if an equilibration emerges in a market, we 
expect to see higher offer-trade ratio at an early stage of each period and a decline of the ratio as 
time goes by.  The tighter patterns of contracts near the end of the periods give an impression of 
market equilibration. 
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Figure 5: Data from Session 2 Experiment 
 
 
 
 
8.2 Private information equilibrium: decision theoretic market demand and supply functions 
Under conditions of certain preferences, the stable matches are directly related to the 
competitive equilibrium if no grid exists or the focus is on the bounding grids that are the nearest 
grids on the two sides on the VCE if grids exist.  Under conditions of uncertainty, candidates for 
the CE and VCE are unknown but theory suggests they can be deduced from the private 
information held by participants.  If participants have no other source of information, the 
expected dividend can be used as a measure of limit prices. Those with relatively high signals 
would be the demanders with the magnitude of signal used to rank buyers from high to low 
thereby creating a demand function with classical shape.  Those with relatively low signals 
having limit prices ranked from low to high creates a supply function with classical shape.  The 
candidate CE or VCE would be at the intersection of these two functions. Of course, such an 
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analysis must reflect a realization that in market participants have access to any information 
contained in the flow of bids and asks so in the last analysis all conclusions must be measured 
against that possibility. 
The next result demonstrates that the market agents self-divide into a market demand 
function and market supply function based on the contacts they make. That is, the high private 
signals create demanders and low private signals create suppliers and the median private signals 
are held by traders at the intersection of the curves.  According to the model, they are the agents 
whose private signals and thus expected values place their limit prices at the CE or the VCE. 
 
Result 7:  Private signal values separate agents into demanders and suppliers that create a stable 
match. Preferences and trading are influenced by private information. Receivers of large signals 
as buyers match up with receivers of small signals as sellers in the market. The median signals 
serve as the CE of VCE of the private information equilibrium model. 
Support. The support follows two steps.  The first is to demonstrate that participants’ buying 
and selling behavior is predicted by the private signals.  The second step uses the bounding grids 
to further identify possible relations to assignment equilibria. 
We use linear regression to test the relation between a subject’s signal and her side of the 
market. We calculate each subject’s net purchase in each period and we rank the subjects 
according to their signal. The subject with highest signal is ranked as 1, second highest as 2 and 
so on. Our first hypothesis is that, the higher the rank of signal, the more likely the subject is 
going to purchase. We run the test separately for the first three experiments with grid (column 1) 
and last three without grid (column 4). The coefficients are significant and negative. 
A further step to validate the assignment model is to look at the two bounding prices in 
the equilibrium. We use the static theory that tells us to look for bounding prices for the market 
equilibrium (the VCE that we assume exists). Because of the uncertainty, (expectations and thus 
preferences are changing with experience) the market price does not converge to the same two 
bounding prices in all periods.  We only focus on candidates for equilibrium prices that can be 
associated with bounding grid prices. Then we check the identity of buyers at the upper bounding 
grid and sellers at the lower bounding grid. If the traders’ valuation of the security is correlated 
with their signal, receivers of high signals will be high value subjects who are going to bid at 
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upper bounding grid and receivers of low signals will be low value subjects who are going to ask 
at lower bounding grid.  
We test the relationship between subjects’ total purchase at the upper bounding grid with 
their identity (column 2). Similarly, we test the relationship between their total sales at the lower 
bounding grid with their identity and corresponding private information (column 3). The 
coefficients are significant and have the expected sign. Subjects with high signals are more likely 
to buy at the upper grid and those with low signals are more likely to sell at the lower grid. In a 
word, the equilibrium bounding grids are the natural separator that divides the subjects into 
buyers and sellers based on their private signal.  
 
8.3 Stable Assignments as the equilibrium 
We examine the data for evidence that the contracts settle at a stable assignment 
equilibrium. Two features are prominently suggested by the assignment model as and the results 
reported in the previous section: the emergence of contracts only at adjacent grids and a 
convergence process evident in bids and asks.  The fact of asymmetric information creates the 
possibility of information aggregation associated with order flow motivates models in which 
information about the common value and thus demand and supply are endogenous.  As 
suggested in the section above a good candidate is the private information equilibrium and the 
literature suggests the rational expectations equilibrium that would be a consequence of more 
refined information aggregation.  
Private information equilibrium in this context refers to the state where trades are made 
near the median of the private signals of the individuals. Rational expectations equilibrium 
      Table 12: Value separating property of stable match 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) 
 
Experiment with grid 
 
Experiments without grid 
VARIABLES Net Purchase 
Total purchase at high 
bound 
Total sell at low 
bound 
 
Net purchase 
      Rank of Expected 
Value -0.950*** -0.200*** 0.211*** 
 
-0.411*** 
 
-0.0663 -0.0411 -0.0351 
 
-0.0973 
Constant 4.276*** 1.540*** -0.256 
 
1.847*** 
 
-0.335 -0.208 -0.177 
 
-0.491 
      Observations 264 192 192 
 
264 
R-squared 0.44 0.111 0.159   0.064 
 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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corresponds to the hypothetical scenario of where people would trade if all the private signals 
were public. In this context, it corresponds to the maximum likelihood estimate from the 
aggregated signals.  If the grid is in place, the equilibrium would be a VCE and the contract data 
would be at the bounding grids.  The next result establishes those properties in the data. 
 
Result 8: In the common value environment with asymmetric information, the contract prices 
exhibit properties of a stable assignment equilibrium.  The properties of market activity exhibit 
equilibration over time.  
(i) Contract prices exhibit a reduction in variance.  
(ii) The ratio of order flow (bids and asks) relative to contract prices fall and approach 1 (bids 
and asks are placed to trade quickly).  
(iii) If grids exist then contract prices near the end of a period occupy only two, adjacent grids. 
Support. Our data confirms the emergence of equilibration. As a common property of the price 
convergence process, the moving standard deviation of trading prices should decline through 
time. For each period, we take every four neighboring prices and calculate their standard 
deviation. We show that contract prices exhibit a reduction in variance using A-El-G test. In the 
table below, the test results are presented for all six experiments, separately depending on the 
existence of grid. 
44 
 
 
 
T
ab
le
 1
3
: 
T
re
n
d
 o
f 
M
o
v
in
g
 S
.D
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
an
el
 A
: 
E
x
p
er
im
en
ts
 w
it
h
 G
ri
d
 
 
P
er
io
d
 2
 
P
er
io
d
 3
 
P
er
io
d
 4
 
P
er
io
d
 5
 
P
er
io
d
 6
 
P
er
io
d
 7
 
P
er
io
d
 8
 
P
er
io
d
 9
 
P
er
io
d
 
1
0
 
P
er
io
d
 
1
1
 
P
er
io
d
 
1
2
 
B
_
2
 
n
 
R
^
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
0
1
7
0
8
0
4
 
1
5
.7
6
*
*
*
 
4
.3
6
3
 
-2
.8
9
8
 
2
1
.1
3
*
*
*
 
2
6
.8
6
*
*
*
 
4
.2
1
7
 
4
.1
1
4
 
2
2
.2
7
*
*
*
 
0
 
5
.3
6
3
 
-0
.0
7
0
1
 
7
.0
4
8
*
*
*
 
2
2
4
 
0
.8
0
2
 
(5
.8
0
) 
(5
.7
6
) 
(5
.7
6
) 
(5
.7
2
) 
(5
.7
2
) 
(5
.6
9
) 
(5
.7
0
) 
(5
.8
0
) 
(7
.0
5
) 
(5
.8
4
) 
(5
.8
4
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
0
1
7
0
8
0
7
 
-0
.1
6
6
 
2
6
.7
9
*
*
*
 
2
8
.3
9
*
*
*
 
2
7
.3
6
*
*
*
 
2
.8
1
9
 
1
5
.6
5
*
*
*
 
1
8
.5
1
*
*
*
 
7
.9
6
3
 
0
.4
0
9
 
-0
.6
6
1
 
7
.2
6
4
 
(5
.8
0
) 
(5
.8
0
) 
(5
.8
0
) 
(5
.7
4
) 
(5
.7
1
) 
(5
.9
2
) 
(5
.8
4
) 
(6
.0
5
) 
(5
.7
6
) 
(5
.7
4
) 
(5
.9
2
) 
(0
.7
7
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
0
1
7
0
8
0
8
 
8
9
.9
7
*
*
*
 
7
.5
7
2
 
3
1
.2
4
*
*
*
 
2
.4
5
5
 
1
.5
7
 
2
0
.0
8
*
*
*
 
1
.8
1
5
 
2
4
.6
4
*
*
*
 
5
.9
0
1
 
3
7
.6
9
*
*
*
 
1
3
.5
1
*
*
 
(5
.7
1
) 
(5
.7
6
) 
(5
.8
4
) 
(5
.8
0
) 
(5
.8
0
) 
(5
.7
2
) 
(5
.8
0
) 
(5
.7
1
) 
(5
.7
4
) 
(5
.8
4
) 
(5
.7
6
) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
 e
rr
o
rs
 i
n
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*
*
*
 p
<
0
.0
1
, 
*
*
 p
<
0
.0
5
, 
*
 p
<
0
.1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
an
el
 B
: 
E
x
p
er
im
en
ts
 w
it
h
o
u
t 
G
ri
d
 
 
P
er
io
d
 2
 
P
er
io
d
 3
 
P
er
io
d
 4
 
P
er
io
d
 5
 
P
er
io
d
 6
 
P
er
io
d
 7
 
P
er
io
d
 8
 
P
er
io
d
 9
 
P
er
io
d
 
1
0
 
P
er
io
d
 
1
1
 
P
er
io
d
 
1
2
 
B
_
2
 
n
 
R
^
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
0
1
7
0
8
0
9
 
3
1
.1
8
*
*
*
 
4
.1
6
7
 
7
.9
7
6
 
-1
.6
7
9
 
3
.4
4
5
 
4
1
.6
8
*
*
*
 
4
.2
8
4
 
1
0
.4
 
8
.5
1
7
 
1
7
.6
5
*
*
*
 
0
.0
2
1
6
 
6
.1
9
6
*
*
*
 
3
2
4
 
0
.6
9
7
 
(6
.3
0
) 
(6
.3
5
) 
(6
.3
2
) 
(6
.3
6
) 
(6
.3
5
) 
(6
.3
9
) 
(6
.6
0
) 
(6
.4
6
) 
(6
.5
2
) 
(6
.3
5
) 
(6
.3
5
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
0
1
7
0
8
1
0
 
-3
.3
5
7
 
3
.9
0
2
 
3
9
.7
0
*
*
*
 
1
2
.1
2
*
 
1
.4
0
4
 
4
.9
9
6
 
1
0
.1
1
 
2
0
.9
9
*
*
*
 
3
0
.2
1
*
*
*
 
1
3
.8
1
*
*
 
-1
.0
1
8
 
(6
.2
9
) 
(6
.4
6
) 
(6
.7
5
) 
(6
.4
2
) 
(6
.3
9
) 
(6
.6
0
) 
(6
.7
5
) 
(6
.4
6
) 
(6
.3
9
) 
(6
.7
5
) 
(6
.4
6
) 
(0
.6
4
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
0
1
7
0
8
1
1
 
4
3
.2
6
*
*
*
 
4
.1
7
3
 
1
0
.3
3
 
2
1
.5
6
*
*
*
 
2
2
.8
6
*
*
*
 
1
7
.2
9
*
*
*
 
1
7
.6
4
*
*
*
 
3
8
.0
6
*
*
*
 
8
.1
5
2
 
5
9
.3
9
*
*
*
 
3
4
.2
4
*
*
*
 
(6
.3
1
) 
(6
.2
7
) 
(6
.2
7
) 
(6
.3
2
) 
(6
.3
3
) 
(6
.3
9
) 
(6
.3
3
) 
(6
.3
5
) 
(6
.3
1
) 
(6
.2
9
) 
(6
.3
6
) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
 e
rr
o
rs
 i
n
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*
*
*
 p
<
0
.0
1
, 
*
*
 p
<
0
.0
5
, 
*
 p
<
0
.1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
   Fifteen out of 33 periods in experiments with price grids (Panel A) and 16 out of 33 
periods in experiments without grids (Panel B) exhibit a significant declining trend of moving 
variance of trading prices. Because of the price grid, the ending level of moving standard 
deviation is higher in Panel A (B_2=7.048) than in Panel B (B_2=6.196). However, the fact that 
nearly half of the periods are consistent with a declining trend confirms the equilibration process 
whether or not there is a grid. Moreover, for the remaining periods, even though the A-El-G test 
does not illustrate a clear trend, the starting level of moving deviation is so low that it cannot be 
distinguished from the ending level. In those periods, price variation is small from the beginning, 
which is also consistent with existence of equilibrium.  
Besides the moving price variation, another way to show the equilibration process is by 
looking at the offer-trade ratio over time. In our markets, traders make bids and asks before the 
other side takes bids and asks and makes a trade. Therefore, the number of bids and asks during a 
certain interval measures the level of disagreement in the market. When there is limited 
information derived from market activity, traders make offers according to private information 
that varies for each participant. As the model suggests, at the beginning of each experiment, there 
should be large number of bids and asks coming into the market before the first trade is made. As 
time goes by, and information expands the equilibrium price converges, traders agree on that 
price and there will be less offers to make before a trade happens. We construct a measure of 
offer-trade ratio to illustrate the equilibration process. 
We divide a period into several intervals according to the time each trade happens. 
Specifically, we define interval as interval 1 for the period before the first trade happens, equals 
to 2 for the period between the first and second trade and so on. Then we calculate the offer trade 
ratio for each interval. The number of offers is the number of bids plus the number of asks in that 
interval. The number of trades is the number of take-bids and take-asks happen after that interval 
but before the next. Since trades may happen at the same time, the number of trades between two 
intervals can be greater than one. For example, in the three experiments with price grid (Panel 
A), there are 293 intervals in total, of which 270 are followed by only 1 trade.  
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We run the Ashenfelter- El-Gamal (A-El-G) test to show a declining trend in the offer 
trade ratio.  We conduct the test separately for experiments with and without a grid. As shown by 
the table above, in all the periods of the experiments with a grid, the ratio starts at higher level 
than 1.207, the ending level predicted by the model.  In 24 out of 33 periods, the coefficients are 
significant for the estimated starting level. Similarly, in 32 out of 33 periods of the experiments 
without grid the ratio starts at higher level than 1.908, the ending level predicted by the model. In 
28 out of 33 periods, the coefficients are significant for the estimated starting level. Combining 
all the results, the A-El-G tests prove that the declining trend of the offer-trade ratio is a general 
feature of an experimental market. This supports the argument that the market converges to some 
equilibrium.  
Next, we check whether the assignment model predictions are consistent with our 
observation from the data. Specifically, we examine for those experiments with a price grid 
whether bounding grids emerge as the market prices in late stage of each period. To do so, we 
split all trades evenly into two groups according to the time of contracting. Trades in the second 
half are considered “late” trades and the prices for those trades are prices in the late stage. Note 
that those trades might still show varying price of more than two grids.  
We calculate the number of equilibrium prices as well as their distance. If the period has 
no more than two equilibrium prices and their distance is within one grid, the period satisfies the 
prediction of the assignment model. Below we check all the periods with a price grid: 
             Table 15: Number of equilibrium prices and whether they are adjacent prices 
Experiment Period 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
20170804 
number of equilibrium prices 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 1 2 1 
adjacent price Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
             
20170807 
number of equilibrium prices 2 4 2 2 4 3 1 2 2 2 2 
adjacent price Y 
 
Y Y 
  
Y Y Y Y Y 
             
20170808 
number of equilibrium prices 3 3 2 1 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 
adjacent price 
  
Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
    
     Nineteen out of 33 periods have two prices in the group of second half of trades. Four out 
of 33 periods have only one price in the group of second half of trades. For all 19 periods with 
two prices at the end, the two prices are adjacent. The sign of converging to adjacent prices 
implies that not only information aggregation happens, but also the assignment works well in 
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predicting the pattern of equilibrium prices. The bounding grids are similar to those we 
discovered in the first series of experiments. Due to the price grid, agents are unable to contract 
at competitive equilibrium prices.  The equilibrium outcome is actually a set of matches and the 
two adjacent contract prices ensure that the matching is stable.   
 
9 THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRICES 
9.1 Information aggregation 
Two models of information are tested.  The classical rational expectations equilibrium 
holds that all information available to the market will be reflected in market price.  In this case, 
the information available is summarized by the MLE based on the pooling of all signals.  By 
contrast, the private market equilibrium holds that demands and supply values are created from 
private information alone.  In this case, the price would reflect the median of market signals. 
Figure 6 contains the time series for all trades in experiment 20170807, which operated 
with a grid, and experiment 2070810 that had no grid.  The states and information was identical 
for respective periods in the two experiments.   The equilibrium predicted by the private 
information model assumes each individual applies the expected utility model and the 
information contained in his or her own signal to estimate the value of a unit of the security that, 
in turn, serves as the individual demand for a unit.  In this model, individuals do not acquire 
information about the dividend from the buying and selling activities of others. Furthermore, in 
the model, individuals buy or sell only one unit.  The equilibrium is a price range so the figure 
contains the upper and lower bound prices of the range.  The MLE model assumes that 
individuals are able to extract the full posterior probabilities of the dividend given the sample of 
all signals pooled. Market equilibrium prices are based on such assumptions. 
The figure contains a reliable impression of the statistics reported in the result.  The 
variance of contract prices becomes reduced over time and moves in the direction of the private 
information equilibrium.  The same pattern exists for the case where the grid exists and the case 
where the grid does not exist.  Of course, exceptions can be found. 
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Figure 6.  Experiments differ according to the existence of a grid. Payoffs and information are 
identical.  Shown are the time series of contract prices.  Aggregated information for each period 
include maximum likelihood, median signals and actual dividend 
 
Result 9: The private information market equilibrium is accurate with or without a grid. 
Support. There are four possible candidates for which the convergence might occur. They are 
the median private signal (private information equilibrium), the median of individual maximum 
likelihood estimates, the full maximum likelihood estimate based on the aggregated private 
signals, and the true value of the dividend. We calculate the second moment of the difference 
between the price at which the trades equilibrate towards and the four possible candidates and 
compare them. This shows that for both with the grid and without the grid, the price convergence 
is closest to the median signal, i.e., the private information equilibrium.  
 
  Median Signal Median MLE Full MLE True Value 
Grid 21.60 23.29 25.51 27.67 
No Grid 29.27 29.82 32.1 31.86 
 
Table 16: The second moment of the difference between converging prices and four candidates.  
For each period, let the converging price be 𝑝𝑖 and the median signal be 𝑝𝑖,𝑚𝑠. Then the value on 
the table is √∑ (𝑝𝑖 − 𝑝𝑖,𝑚𝑠)2𝑖 . 
 
We could use an alternative measure to test which of the equilibrium is most accurate. 
Under the grid condition, 64.4% of total trades happened in the neighborhood of the median 
signal as opposed to 57.6% of total trades occurring in the neighborhood of the rational 
expectations equilibrium, the full MLE.
11
 
 
 
                                           
11
One possible explanation as to why private information equilibrium outperforms rational expectations equilibrium 
has to do with the distribution we used for the parameters. By setting up a lower bound and an upper bound and 
using a truncated normal distribution, the maximum likelihood estimate is skewed towards extreme endpoints 
especially if the value of the dividend is not near the center.  
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9.2 The Average Trading Price 
A natural question to pose is about the information content of average contract prices.  
The issue is especially interesting in the case of a grid where marginal information cannot be 
contained in prices or in order flow.  The next result says that average contract price contains key 
information when the grid exists and when it does not exist. The study of values induced with 
certainty demonstrated that average price is close to the VCE but here VCE is unknown because 
preferences based on beliefs are unknown. Based upon the assumption that average price 
approximates the VCE we can ask about the implicit information aggregation and assess market 
equilibration models based on the aggregation of information contained in market activity.   
Under the information aggregation setting, due to the uncertainty of individual signals, 
the price discovery process takes longer. Therefore, instead of using the average price of all 
trades, we focus on the final five trades where convergence occurs. We treat the median signal as 
a private information equilibrium since market demand/supply can be constructed from the limit 
prices implied by expected value maximization and use the difference between average trade 
price and the median signal as a proxy for how close the trades are to the underlying value. 
Result 10.  The average trading price moves toward the CE when it exists and the VCE when the 
CE does not exist.  
Support.  The first observation is the relation between the median of the private information 
signals and the time during period as contained in Table 16. 
 
Table 17. Gap between average trade prices and the median private signal (i.e. the private 
information equilibrium) 
 |Average trade price 
- median signal| 
All 
trades 
First 
five 
trades 
Last 
five 
trades 
All Periods 22 27.9 18.6 
Early periods (2-6) 24.7 32.1 19.9 
Latter periods (7-12) 19.7 24.4 17.5 
 
There are two key observations to be made here. First, we see that the discrepancy is 
larger for the earlier periods compared to the latter periods. Add the number of observations to 
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the table to make clear exactly what has gone into the count. Convergence toward aggregated 
information available or the closely positioned private information equilibrium takes place across 
periods. This suggests a base rate fallacy where the subjects put too much weight on their own 
signals compared to others’. Second, the first five trades exhibit a much larger difference with 
the median signal. That is, convergence takes place within a period as well. 
Furthermore, we can break it down into cases with grid and without grid. 
 
Table 18. Gap between average trade prices and the median private signal (private information 
equilibrium) with/without grid 
Average trade price 
minus median signal  
Grid No Grid 
All 
trades 
First 
five  
trades 
Last 
five 
trades 
All 
trades 
First 
five 
trades 
Last 
five 
trades 
All Periods 21.6 25.9 17.1 22.4 29.9 20.1 
Early periods (2-6) 21.9 28.6 15.9 27.6 35.6 23.9 
Latter periods (7-12) 21.3 23.6 18.0 18.1 25.2 17.0 
 
Notice that in all cases the movement is greater in the no grid case, which suggests that 
the information reflected in the average trade price, is not reduced by the existence of a grid.  
The ability of the average price in a market to reflect information aggregation beyond the private 
information equilibrium is not influenced by the grid. However, in assessing the information 
content of average price about the underlying value of the dividend, the convergence of prices 
cannot be neglected.  
The two observations still hold true with the exception of the gap shrinking from early to 
latter periods when there is a grid imposed. More importantly, the pooled difference is actually 
smaller with the existence of a grid even though it is statistically insignificant. This implies that 
the average price of last trades does in fact carry price information, which permeates the large 
grid size. 
Below, in Figure 7, we plot (median signal-average contract price of first five trades) on 
the horizontal axis and (average price of last five trades-average price of first five trades) on the 
vertical axis. A strong positive relation suggests that if the first five trades are too low compared 
53 
 
to the median signal, then the trade prices are going to go up and vice versa. Ideally, we would 
expect the points to be around y=x, so there is a bit of under-correction.  The figure reports the 
data from the grid and the no grid periods.  In both cases, the average contract price moves 
toward the median signal. Average transaction price carries information about the median of 
signals. 
 
 
Figure 7. Price Adjustments to Signals. Median signal deviation from last five trades’ v median 
signal deviation from first five trades.  Price movement is toward the median of the signals 
stopped 
 
10. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
Grids and tick sizes have not been studied experimentally.  The advantages of an 
experimental approach are made apparent by a lack of consensus in the policy related literature 
and a disconnection from the classical theory of markets, which has a successful history 
unmasking basic principles of market behavior.  Traditional analysis pivots on the competitive 
equilibrium, its game theory variants and the dynamics it suggests about disequilibrium 
y = 0.4567x + 5.6869 
R² = 0.5312 
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adjustments.  When a tick-related price grid is imposed on a market, the fundamental tool, the 
competitive equilibrium, need not exist.  No consensus exists about appropriate theory.  Thus, 
the question backs into a broad question of what theories might apply.  Our exploratory approach 
suggests experiments that might point to deeper understanding of these real-world phenomena.    
          Our study begins with experiments involving large tick sizes, a stationary market and no 
uncertainty about values.  The main discovery is that the appropriate model appears to be stable 
assignments from matching theory. With that background model in mind, we study suggestions 
from related literature and examine issues raised in the policy related literature. 
          Principles taken from the stable matching model make precise predictions for cases when a 
competitive equilibrium exists and cases when its existence is destroyed by the imposition of a 
grid.  Result 1 and Result 2 demonstrate the power of a stable assignment model as a predictor of 
the experimental outcomes.  Result 4 demonstrates that the average of the bouncing of prices 
created by the non-existence of the competitive equilibrium actually approximates the 
competitive equilibrium price. Result 5 and Result 6 address issues of speculation, market depth 
and liquidity.  In these experiments, the imposition of a grid increases liquidity and volume but it 
does so at the expense of market efficiency and brings losses for those seduced into speculation. 
          Order flow in these stationary markets bears similarity to that in markets without a tick 
size grid.  Namely, the direction of order flow reflects excess demand/supply.  It remains to be 
determined if such patterns continue to hold as parameters change or substantial asymmetric 
information is introduced.  
         A second series of experiments examine a market trading a security with an uncertain 
(dividend) payoff.  The results are similar to the certainty case in the sense that grid impeded 
contracts still converge to the bounding prices of a virtual competitive equilibrium (VCE.)  The 
VCE that emerges is a private information equilibrium.  That is, it assumes that reservation 
prices are based on private information as opposed to information based on the aggregation of all 
information that would reflect the maximum likelihood of aggregated information.   
Interestingly, while the prices do not approximate the maximum likelihood of the security 
payoff, prices do carry key information.  The average trading price is a close approximation of 
the VCE determined by the median of the information distribution. 
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Appendix AlTable 1- 
Parameters Series 1 :(160212; 160224; 160307)[periods;grid] 
160212 1      pd2-6 gd250 ps7-11 gd1  
Type(no.) 1st 2nd 3rd 4th  type 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
B1 (1) 260 225 165 155  B1 (1) 2500 2100 1700 1300 900 
B3 (1) 255 200 160 155  B3 (1) 2400 2000 1600 1200 800 
B5 (1) 260 250 175 160  B5 (1) 2300 1900 1500 1100 700 
B7 (1) 235 215 195 160  B7 (1) 2200 1800 1400 1000 600 
S2 (1) 120 155 215 220  S2 (1) 250 650 1050 1450 1850 
S4 (1) 125 180 220 225  S4 (1) 350 750 1150 1550 1950 
S6 (1) 120 130 205 220  S6 (1) 450 850 1250 1650 2050 
S8 (1) 145 165 185 225  S8 (1) 550 950 1350 1750 2150 
 
 1    
  pd2-6 gd50 pd7-11 gd1  
Type(no.) 1st 2nd 3rd 4th  type 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
B1 (1) 260 225 165 155  B1 (2) 2500 2100 1700 1300 900 
B3 (1) 255 200 160 155  B3 (1) 2400 2000 1600 1200 800 
B5 (1) 260 250 175 160  B5 (1) 2300 1900 1500 1100 700 
B7 (1) 235 215 195 160  B7 (1) 2200 1800 1400 1000 600 
S2 (1) 120 155 215 220  S2 (1) 250 650 1050 1450 1850 
S4 (1) 125 180 220 225  S4 (1) 350 750 1150 1550 1950 
S6 (1) 120 130 205 220  S6 (1) 450 850 1250 1650 2050 
S8 (0) 145 165 185 225  S8 (0) 550 950 1350 1750 2150 
 
 
1      pd2-6 gd250 pd7-
11 
gd1  
Type(no.) 1st 2nd 3rd 4th  type 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
B1 (2) 260 225 165 155  B1 (2) 2500 2100 1700 1300 900 
B3 (2) 255 200 160 155  B3 (2) 2400 2000 1600 1200 800 
B5 (1) 260 250 175 160  B5 (1) 2300 1900 1500 1100 700 
B7 (1) 235 215 195 160  B7 (1) 2200 1800 1400 1000 600 
S2 (1) 120 155 215 220  S2 (1) 250 650 1050 1450 1850 
S4 (1) 125 180 220 225  S4 (1) 350 750 1150 1550 1950 
S6 (1) 120 130 205 220  S6 (1) 450 850 1250 1650 2050 
S8 (1) 145 165 185 225  S8 (1) 550 950 1350 1750 2150 
 
  
160224
160307
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Appendix A:Table 2 
 
Parameters Series 2 
169325       pd1-6 Grid20 pd7-10 grid1  
type 1st 2nd 3rd 4th        
B1 (2) 260 225 165 155  B1 (2) 394 246 206 202 158 
B3 (1) 255 200 160 155  B3 (1) 374 274 206 200 168 
B5 (1) 260 250 175 160  B5 (2) 354 314 216 198 178 
B7 (1) 235 215 195 160  B7 (1) 334 294 218 188 148 
S2 (2) 120 155 215 220  S2 (2) 26 174 214 218 262 
S4 (1) 125 180 220 225  S4 (1) 46 146 216 220 252 
S6 (2) 120 130 205 220  S6 (2) 66 106 206 222 242 
S8 (1) 145 165 185 225  S8 (1) 86 126 202 232 272 
 
 
160329 pd1 gd1     pd2-8  gd20 pd9-11 gd1  
type 1st 2nd 3rd 4th        
B1 (3) 260 225 165 155  B1 (3) 394 246 206 202 158 
B3 (3) 255 200 160 155  B3 (3) 374 274 206 200 168 
B5 (3) 260 250 175 160  B5 (3) 354 314 216 198 178 
B7 (3) 235 215 195 160  B7 (3) 334 294 218 188 148 
S2 (3) 120 155 215 220  S2 (3) 26 174 214 218 262 
S4 (3) 125 180 220 225  S4 (3) 46 146 216 220 252 
S6 (2) 120 130 205 220  S6 (2) 66 106 206 222 242 
S8 (2) 145 165 185 225  S8 (2) 86 126 202 232 272 
 
 
160331 Pd1,6 gd1     pd2-5 gd20    
type 1st 2nd 3rd 4th        
B1 (3) 160 125 65 55  B1 (3) 394 246 206 202 158 
B3 (3) 155 100 60 55  B3 (3) 374 274 206 200 168 
B5 (2) 160 150 75 60  B5 (2) 354 314 216 198 178 
B7 (2) 135 115 95 60  B7 (2) 334 294 218 188 148 
S2 (3) 20 55 115 120  S2 (3) 26 174 214 218 262 
S4 (3) 25 80 120 125  S4 (3) 46 146 216 220 252 
S6 (2) 20 30 105 120  S6 (2) 66 106 206 222 242 
S8 (2) 45 65 85 125  S8 (2) 86 126 202 232 272 
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160507 pd1-6 gd1 pd7-11 gd20        
type 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th       
B1 (2) 494 346 306 302 258       
B3 (1) 474 374 306 300 268       
B5 (2) 454 414 316 298 278       
B7 (2) 434 394 318 288 248       
S2 (2) 126 274 314 318 362       
S4 (2) 146 246 316 320 352       
S6 (2) 166 206 306 322 342       
S8 (2) 186 226 302 332 372       
 
Appendix B: Example Information provided to subjects 
 
Most likely state: 104.3 
Standard deviation of the most likely state: 56.3 
Bin Period 1 Bin Period 1 
[100,110] 12.57% [250,260] 0.54% 
[110,120] 12.37% [260,270] 0.35% 
[120,130] 11.84% [270,280] 0.22% 
[130,140] 11.03% [280,290] 0.14% 
[140,150] 9.99% [290,300] 0.08% 
[150,160] 8.80% [300,310] 0.05% 
[160,170] 7.54% [310,320] 0.03% 
[170,180] 6.28% [320,330] 0.01% 
[180,190] 5.09% [330,340] 0.01% 
[190,200] 4.02% [340,350] 0.00% 
[200,210] 3.08% [350,360] 0.00% 
[210,220] 2.30% [360,370] 0.00% 
[220,230] 1.67% [370,380] 0.00% 
[230,240] 1.18% [380,390] 0.00% 
[240,250] 0.81% [390,400] 0.00% 
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